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Chapter one links the foreign exchange risk premium to macroeconomic risk by
studying the options market around macroeconomic news releases. Using a unique
data set of overnight currency option prices, I study the reaction of the entire state
price density to both anticipated and recently occurring macroeconomic news releases
for both US and foreign announcements. I then use intraday data to compare the
behavior of the physical pdf around these news releases over the same tenor as the
option. I ﬁnd signiﬁcant movements in the implied distribution that can be linked
to macroeconomic news both ex-ante and ex-post. The volatility risk premium in
the overnight options market is large across all currencies, and a strategy that sells
insurance through the form of overnight straddles around US non-farm payroll re-
leases earns signiﬁcant proﬁts. Nonetheless, a signiﬁcant portion of the volatility risk
premium remains that cannot be explained through macroeconomic news despite the
short lifespan of these options.
Chapter two studies the evolution of last-resort operations in the recent credit
crisis of 2007-2008. The ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007 took place in the context
of a secular shift from a bank-loan ﬁnancial system to a capital-markets ﬁnancial
system; that is, from one based on nontradable ﬁnancial assets, with banks playing
the key intermediary role, to one based on tradable securities, with dealers playing
the key intermediary role. We argue that the system's response to the crisis can be
viewed as moving from a private lender of last resort, through a public lender of last
resort, to a dealer of last resort. It was the last that was ﬁnally able to stabilize the
system, because it is the response suited to a liquidity crisis in the capital-markets
ﬁnancial system where the problem arose. We use a balance-sheet approach to trace
out the breakdown of the so-called shadow banking system and the measures taken
ﬁrst in the private money markets and then by the Federal Reserve to restore liquidity
to the ﬁnancial system.
Chapter three studies the eﬀect of hedging imbalances in the foreign exchange
market as a possible explanation for deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity. Spec-
ulators, becoming weary of holding excess demand for forward hedges, hedge their
own exposure in the currency options market. The subsequent increase in option
prices is a consequence of this market overhang and is reﬂected in the implied volatil-
ity of currency options. Separating out implied from forecast volatility, we construct
a measure of hedging imbalances and add this to the standard UIP regression. For
some currencies, a partial rehabilitation of UIP is found.
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1Chapter 1
Foreign Exchange Risk Premia and
Macroeconomic Announcements:
Evidence from Overnight Currency
Options1
1.1 Introduction
The established link between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals
has been tenuous. Since the results of Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) showing that none of
the standard macroeconomic models of the exchange rate could outperform a random
walk even in sample, this exchange rate disconnect puzzle has been a major area
1I am extremely grateful to Charles Jones for guidance throughout this project, to
Robert Hodrick for detailed comments and helpful discussions as well as for funding
the purchase of the intraday data, and to Perry Mehrling for continued support and
encouragement. I would also like to thank Dennis Kristensen, Dan O'Flaherty, Bruce
Preston, Fang He, Guilherme Martins, Alexander McQuoid and participants in the
Columbia Business School Finance Student Colloquium and the Eastern Finance As-
sociation annual conference for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank Tanya
Balsky and Kevin Grad for help with the high frequency data. All errors are mine.
2of research in international ﬁnance. In an attempt to connect exchange rates to
fundamentals a number of papers have studied the response of spot exchange rates
and volatility to scheduled macroeconomic announcements. These studies share an
ex post perspective by using historical spot rate data to describe market responses to
news. The majority of this literature has shown empirically that spot exchange rates
do react to select announcements in the period after their release, although these
eﬀects often vary by currency and the time period considered.
This paper takes an ex-ante perspective by studying the behavior of option im-
plied densities derived from very short term currency options around macroeconomics
announcement dates. These options are inherently forward looking in that they are
quoted in the evening prior to the announcement occurring, and expire almost im-
mediately afterward. By studying the behavior of option implied densities around
macroeconomic announcement dates, I attempt to go beyond the study of realized
exchange rate behavior and establish a link between macroeconomic fundamentals
and the currency risk premium. Densities derived from option prices are unique in
that they scale the perceived objective probability of future states occurring (i.e. as
per the physical pdf) by the risk aversion of the investor. In other words, they com-
bine investor beliefs toward the probability of each state occurring with preferences
toward each state. By examining the behavior of this implied distribution around
macroeconomic announcements and then comparing to the physical pdf, one can dis-
entangle investor preferences from beliefs in order to ascertain whether there exists
an announcement risk premium that can be linked to macroeconomic fundamentals.
The motivation for this framework is the work of Beber and Brandt (2006) in the
US ﬁxed income market. In addition, studying the behavior of short-term currency
options around macroeconomic announcements rather than the reaction of spot rates
gives a glimpse into agent expectations rather than market realizations. As the prices
of these options give a measure of which macroeconomic announcements agents are
willing to pay to hedge against ex-ante, they provide an empirical way to understand
3what macro announcements matter to foreign exchange market participants, if any.
There are two main contributions of this paper. The ﬁrst is to study the
eﬀects of both domestic and foreign macroeconomic announcements on the behavior
of the moments of the option implied density both immediately prior to their release
and immediately following. To the best of my knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to
study the relationship between over-the-counter currency options and scheduled news
releases.2 While previous papers have used exchange traded currency options data
with longer tenors to study the ex-post reaction of at the money implied volatilities
to macroeconomic announcements (Kim and Kim (2003), Ederington and Lee (1996),
Madura and Tucker (1992), Bailey (1988)) the very short lifespans of the overnight
options considered here allow me to both better isolate the announcement eﬀect and
to take an ex-ante perspective as well. Rather than focusing only on at the money
volatilities, I use a cross section of strike prices available on each day to extract a
time series of model free implied volatilities, skewness and kurtosis. While these
option implied moments combine investor beliefs with preferences, they can give an
indication of which macroeconomic announcements are believed ex-ante to aﬀect the
underlying currency pairs and whether an announcement risk premium is likely to
exist.
The second contribution is to link the behavior of the option implied distri-
bution to the existence of a currency risk premium related to macroeconomic an-
nouncements. I do this in two ways. The ﬁrst is to compare the moments of the
option implied pdf around announcements to those of the physical pdf, as per Beber
and Brandt (2006) in order to disentangle the beliefs and preferences combined in
the option implied distribution. I use intraday spot exchange rate data (spot quotes
captured every ﬁve minutes) to construct the realized moments of the distribution
over the life of the option on each day, and compare these to the implied moments.
2As explained below, the over the counter currency options market dominates the exchange traded
options market in terms of size and liquidity, and also has many institutional features that make the
data more suitable for this analysis.
4The second is to focus on the volatility risk premium (the diﬀerence between implied
and realized volatility) by looking at trading strategies which sell overnight straddles
around macroeconomic announcement dates. The purchase of a straddle around an
announcement can be thought of as a form of insurance against exchange rate move-
ments caused by the news release, and if investors are averse to such movements they
should be prepared to pay a premium for this insurance. Should the proﬁts to selling
straddles around macroeconomic announcements be proﬁtable on average, this would
suggest the existence of a risk premium.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, the anticipation of an an-
nouncement tends to increase the implied volatilities of options only prior to the US
payrolls and CPI announcements.3 The implied kurtosis tends to fall rather than rise
in anticipation of these announcements, while the eﬀect on skewness is not generally
signiﬁcant. Second, the response of the option implied distribution to the occurrence
of an announcement tends to depend on the content of the news. A better than ex-
pected release on the payroll announcement causes implied volatility to fall, while a
worse than expected release causes implied volatility to fall relatively less. While not
greatly discussed in the previous literature, the content of the ISM news release is
found to be important in the case of bad news. A worse than expected ISM number
causes implied volatility to rise into the night after its release. Third, a number of
observations arise from comparing the realized moments to the risk-neutral moments.
Realized volatility increases by a similar magnitude as implied volatility on payroll
announcement dates. As well, realized volatility increases signiﬁcantly on US trade
balance announcement days, despite implied volatility not being higher on these days.
Conversely, while implied volatility was found to be signiﬁcantly higher around CPI
announcements, this is not true of realized volatility. These ﬁndings suggest that
agents are willing to pay a premium to insure against volatility stemming from the
3Certain foreign announcements tend to be signiﬁcant as well, with the type of announcement
that is important varying by country.
5CPI announcement, while volatility stemming from the trade balance announcement
is not fully priced. No consistent pattern is found when comparing the realized skew-
ness on announcement days to the implied skewness. Finally, I ﬁnd evidence of a large
volatility risk premium in the overnight options maket. Although this may partly be
attributed to macroeconomic announcement risk, a signiﬁcant portion remains that
appears unrelated to scheduled news. Consistent proﬁts can be earned by selling
overnight straddles around payroll announcement releases, yet a strategy of selling
straddles on non-announcement days is also proﬁtable on average (albeit less so) and
the proﬁts of these two strategies are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for all but one of the
currency pairs considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes
the theory behind how options can be used to infer information on investor risk pre-
mia and explains the method used to extract the moments of the option implied
distribution. Section 3 describes the currency options data and the announcements
considered. Section 4 ﬁrst investigates the ex-ante response of option-implied mo-
ments to the news releases and then studies the ex-post response, conditioning on the
content of the news release. Sections 5 introduces the intraday exchange rate data
and explains the construction of the realized moments, while section 6 conducts the
same analysis as sections 4 on the realized moments, in order to compare the behavior
of the risk-neutral and physical distributions on announcement days. Section 7 fur-
ther investigates the behavior of the volatility risk premium and constructs a trading
strategy which sells overnight straddles around payroll announcements. Section 8
concludes.
61.2 The Information Contained in the Option Im-
plied Distribution
The relationship between asset prices to scheduled news has been a popular
topic in the literature, both to better understand the relationship between asset prices
and macroeconomic fundamentals and to investigate whether news is a cause of time-
varying volatility in asset prices. Examples include Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine
(1998) in the ﬁxed income markets and Patell and Wolfson (1981) and Johannes
and Dubinsky (2006) in the equity markets. Foreign exchange as an asset class has
received particular attention in this literature due to the aforementioned disconnect
between economic models that link exchange rate determination to macroeconomic
fundamentals and the empirical evidence of this link. Consequently, a large literature
has studied the ex-post eﬀects of macroeconomic announcement surprises on spot
exchange rates. Prominent examples include Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega
(2003), Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2007), James and Kasikov (2008) and
Waldman (2008).
In contrast, few papers have looked at the behavior of currency options around
announcement dates. Kim and Kim (2003) study the behavior of implied volatili-
ties derived from CME options on currency futures around 11 US macroeconomic
announcements from 1987 - 1998. They ﬁnd that especially for the non-farm employ-
ment report and the trade balance implied volatilities tend to fall signiﬁcantly upon
release; an eﬀect which is interpreted, in line with much of the previous literature,
as a resolution of uncertainty. Madura and Tucker (1992) study American style cur-
rency options traded on the PHLX around trade deﬁcit announcements from 1986 to
1989. They ﬁnd that greater trade deﬁcit surprises tend to increase ex-ante exchange
rate implied volatility (increasing the implied volatility over the remaining life of the
options), while trade deﬁcit announcements in themselves, regardless of their content,
decrease uncertainty on average.
7Rather than focus solely on option implied volatilities, I use the entire option
implied distribution to investigate agent expectations around these announcements.
This results in a measure of the changing beliefs and preferences of market partici-
pants, as per Beber and Brandt (2006). To clarify, consider the price of a European
style call option on an underlying asset St with expiration date t+ n and strike price
K. This price is given by
Ct,n,K = Et [Mt,t+nmax(St+n −K)]
whereMt,t+n denotes a stochastic discount factor. Suppressing the n and K subscript









where p(St, St+n) denotes the conditional distribution of the underlying and q(St, St+n)
denotes the corresponding risk-neutral distribution deﬁned by the transformation
q(St, St+n) = e
rntnMt,t+np(St, St+n) (1.2)
The risk-neutral distribution, or state price density q(St, St+n) eﬀectively scales the
actual probability of the value that the asset will take on at the expiration of the
option, p(St+n) by the stochastic discount factor. This equation illustrates how the
state-price density (1.2) combines the beliefs of market participants about future
states, p(St, St+n), with the preferences of market participants toward these states, as
measured by the stochastic discount factor Mt,t+n. In other words, the risk-neutral
probability of each state occurring is equal to the actual probability multiplied by a
risk-aversion adjustment.
The risk-neutral distribution q derives its name from the fact that it allows
us to discount the price of the call option Ct in (1.1) above by the risk-free rate
only, thus pricing the option as if agents were risk neutral. The adjustment for
8risk aversion is taken into account within the expectation itself through the rescaled
probabilities rather than through the discounting. Crucial to this paper is the fact
that the pdf q combines the assessment of market participants as to the probability
of future exchange rate movements actually occurring with their preferences toward
these states, i.e., their attitude toward risk. Galati et al. (2006) use the analogy of
ﬁre insurance. An increase in the premium paid by homeowners for ﬁre insurance
could be due either to the fact that the owners view a ﬁre as more likely to occur (a
change in p) or that they have revised her view on the potential losses that would be
suﬀered should a ﬁre occur (a change in M). By only observing an increase in the
insurance premium we do not know which reason is the cause. In the same way, by
observing a leftward shift in the risk-neutral pdf q(St+n) the cause could be either
market participants viewing a fall of St as more likely over the period t + n until
the option expires or due to market participants revising their views of the potential
losses associated with a depreciation of the asset.
In the sections that follow, I ﬁrst study the behavior of the risk-neutral dis-
tribution as a whole around macroeconomic announcement dates and then attempt
to separate between the eﬀects on beliefs versus preferences in order to isolate the
risk premium. Their are two purposes to this exercise. First, the implied volatility
derived from currency options, or second moment of the option implied exchange
rate distribution q(St+n), has been shown to be a fairly accurate predictor of future
currency volatility (Poon (2005), Christoﬀersen and Mazotta (2004), Charoenwong
et al. (2009)).4 Thus, the implied volatility of a short-dated option that spans a
macroeconomic announcement can be used as a measure of uncertainty stemming
from the announcement itself. This has been the main crux of previous studies of
4It is well established that currency implied volatility tends to be an upwardly biased predictor
of future volatility due to the presence of a risk premium (see for example Chernov (2007), Christof-
fersen and Mazotta (2004)). Nonetheless, implied volatilty is still found to be a more accurate
predictor of future volatility than volatility models which rely on historical data, such as GARCH
models.
9currency option implied volatility around macroeconomic announcement dates (Ed-
erington and Lee (1996), Madura and Tucker (1992), Kim and Kim (2003)). In this
way we can study whether uncertainty tends to build prior to scheduled macroeco-
nomic releases, and whether volatility tends to dissipate following its release or spill
over into the following day. This type of analysis is pertinent to the literature that
seeks to identify the drivers of foreign exchange volatility. As many papers point
out, although there is a consensus that foreign exchange volatility varies over time
there is still no agreement as to why. News is an often cited candidate in both the
theory and empirical literature, and ﬁxed announcements provide an objective news
source that is easy to identify. Also, the fact that implied volatility has been shown
to forecast future volatility quite well means that studying implied volatility around
macroeconomic announcements allows us to deduce which macroeconomic indicators
are considered important by market participants in terms of having an impact on
exchange rates. If we deﬁne the drop in implied volatility after an announcement as
a resolution of uncertainty, then as pointed out by Ederington and Lee (1996), in or-
der for there to be much uncertainty to resolve, an announcement must be viewed as
likely to impact the price of the underlying security. Given the feeble empirical link
between macroeconomic fundamentals and currencies, this is especially important in
our context.
Second, studying the higher moments of the risk-neutral distribution rather
than only focusing on implied volatilities gives a broader view of the impact of macroe-
conomic announcements on both the beliefs and preferences of currency market par-
ticipants. By extracting the entire risk-neutral distribution I can disentangle whether
the change in its shape around announcements is due to agents revising their beliefs
as to future exchange rate movements or becoming more risk averse. Given two of
the major puzzles in the international ﬁnance literature: the aforementioned discon-
nect between exchange rates and macro fundamentals as well as the hunt for the risk
premium in currency returns, the options data provides a way to relate the foreign
10
exchange risk premium to macroeconomic variables.
1.3 Data
There are two main components to the data set used in this paper. The
ﬁrst consists of a daily series of over-the-counter overnight currency options with a
cross-section of strikes available on each date. The second consists of the scheduled
macroeconomic announcement dates. In this section I describe each in detail.
1.3.1 Overnight Currency Options
Daily data comprised of overnight currency option prices is acquired from a
major foreign exchange options dealer. These are European style options which are
traded over the counter (OTC). The quotes are captured at 6 PM New York (Eastern)
time, and the options expire at 10 AM the next day, giving them an extremely short
lifetime of 16 hours.5 These options are sometimes literally described as `the cost of
sleeping at night' and are used to either speculate on or hedge against short term
movements in the underlying currencies. The foreign exchange market is active 24
hours a day due to the overlap of time zones worldwide, with the most liquid trading
occurring from 3AM to 11AM Eastern time. One might therefore expect signiﬁcant
currency movements overnight from a New York perspective6 so that it seems logical
that such an options market exists for overnight hedging. This data also has the
beneﬁt of covering the most liquid period of foreign exchange trading.
The short time frame of these options provide an ideal way to capture an-
nouncement eﬀects. Most of the US announcements considered occur prior to 10AM
5These 'overnight' options, although named as such, are in fact quoted throughout the day, i.e.,
anytime after 10AM when the previous day's overnight option expires. It is solely a feature of my
particular data set that the quotes happen to be captured at 6PM.
6I will take the perspective of an investor located in New York and hence 'overnight' refers to
after 6PM New York time, in line with the data.
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EST, and the majority of foreign announcements occur overnight. As such, overnight
options provide a unique window into capturing shifts in the option implied distri-
bution due to announcement eﬀects without capturing as much other noise as one
would if using options of longer maturities.
The Over the Counter market is dominant for currency options. Previous pa-
pers that study currency options around announcements have used exchange traded
options: either currency options traded on the Philadelphia stock exchange or options
on currency futures traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. OTC options are
preferable for the purpose of this study for a number of reasons. First, the OTC mar-
ket is the primary one for fx options trading and as such is more liquid. The Bank for
International Settlements as of 2010 estimates daily OTC currency options turnover
to be $207 billion versus $166 billion for all exchange traded currency derivative in-
struments. Second, in the OTC market a new option for a ﬁxed maturity is quoted
each day. In contrast, exchange traded options generally expire on ﬁxed calendar
days so that their prices on successive days pertain to options of decreasing maturity.
This feature of the OTC data combined with the short time span of our options give
a much cleaner measure of announcement day eﬀects than exchange traded options.
Finally, exchange traded options are generally American style while OTC options are
European, obviating the need to worry about early exercise. These features make
OTC option quotes good candidates for my empirical analysis.
Market conventions for OTC currency options are quite diﬀerent from standard
exchange traded quotes.7 Three main features that distinguish the OTC currency
options market are that quotes are given in terms of Black-Scholes implied volatility8
rather than price, moneyness is quoted in terms of delta rather than strike, and the
7Detailed explanations of OTC currency option market conventions can be found in Castagna
(2010) and Reiswich and Wystup (2009).
8Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) modiﬁed the Black-Scholes formula for currency options and as
such the implied volatilities are often referred to as Garman-Kohlhagen implied volatilities rather
than Black-Scholes implied volatilities.
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market is most liquid over straddles, risk reversals and butterﬂies rather than the
standard vanilla puts and calls.9 Finally, currency options refer to an underlying spot
rate that follows the industry convention as to which currency (home or domestic)
is quoted as the numeraire currency, and as such the numeraire currency changes
depending on the exchange rate that is quoted. On this last point, the industry
convention is to write each currency pair in the style XXX/YYY where Y is the
numeraire currency. For example, the euro versus the US dollar would be written
EUR/USD and quoted in terms of US dollars per euro, while the dollar versus the
Japanese yen would be written USD/JPY and quoted in terms of yen per US dollars.
In order to properly work with the options data, I keep all spot rates in terms of their
industry conventions.10 Table 3.4 summarizes the style of quote for each currency.
9Castagna (2011) provides a detailed overview of currency option market conventions. As he
points out, quoting options in terms of implied volatilities and strikes in terms of deltas means that
before closing the deal the strike price is not yet determined in absolute terms. This allows the
purchaser and dealer not to worry about small movements in the underlying currency during the
bargaining process, as the strike level is speciﬁed only after the price (in terms of implied volatility)
is agreed upon. Once the purchaser accepts the implied volatility quote, she will generally provide
a spot reference which serves both to deﬁne the strike price and premium of the option in absolute
terms, and to give a price to the dealer for the spot rate which the dealer will generally buy in order
to delta hedge.
10The fact that the currency options are quoted in terms of implied volatilities and that their deltas
(by which the strike price is quoted) change depending on the numeraire currency makes it diﬃcult
to switch all option quotes around into a single numeraire while being precise about extracting the
strike prices from the options data.
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Symbol Deﬁnition Numeraire or Implication of
'Domestic' Currency Negative Skewness
EUR/USD US dollars per euro US dollar USD appreciation
USD/JPY Japanese yen per USD Japanese yen JPY appreciation
USD/CHF Swiss francs per USD Swiss franc CHF appreciation
USD/CAD Canadian dollars per USD Canadian dollar CAD appreciation
AUD/USD US Dollars per Australian dollar US dollar USD appreciation
NZD/USD US Dollars per New Zealand dollars US dollar USD appreciation
USD/SEK Swedish kronas per USD Swedish krona SEK appreciation
USD/NOK Norwegian krones per USD Norwegian krone NOK appreciation
EUR/JPY Japanese yen per euro Japanese yen JPY appreciation
AUD/JPY Japanese yen per Australian dollar Japanese yen JPY appreciation
Table 1.1: Industry quotation conventions for the currency spot rates considered, in
order to clarify which is the numeraire currency in each case. 'Implication of negative
skewness' means that for example, negative skewness in the EUR/USD pair is toward
dollar appreciation, while negative skewness in the USD/JPY pair is toward dollar
depreciation.
The currency options data set consists of implied volatility quotes for the three
most liquid structures traded in the fx options market: at the money straddles (a
combination of a call and a put with the strike price set equal to the forward rate11),
10 and 25 delta risk-reversals (a long position in a call combined with a short position
in a put with a symmetric delta) and 10 and 25 delta butterﬂy spreads (a short
position in an at the money straddle combined with a long position in a symmetric
delta strangle, where a strangle is constructed by the purchase of an equally out of
the money call and put). Denoting the implied volatility of the at the money straddle
by ATM , and letting δ denote the delta of the out of the money options, the implied
11In this data set, the at the money straddles are those whose strike prices are set equal to the
forward rate (they are at-the-money-forward straddles). A more common market convention would
be to deﬁne an at the money straddle as one whose strike price is such that it makes the delta of the
straddle equal to zero. For short-dated options, the diﬀerence between these deﬁnitions is negligible.
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volatility of the risk reversal is deﬁned as
RR = σδc − σδp (1.3)




The at the money straddle gives a measure of the level of the implied volatility smile,
while the risk-reversal gives a measure of its asymmetry or slope and the butterﬂy
gives a measure of its curvature. Hence, the three main structures allow market
participants to trade on movements in the shape of the implied volatility smile.
Given the implied volatility quotes and deltas, one can convert the options data
to market prices by ﬁrst ﬁnding the strike price K corresponding to each level of delta
speciﬁed by the out of the money options and then plugging this strike price along with
the current value of the spot rate and interest rates into the Black-Scholes formula to
arrive at the price. Market prices rather than implied volatilities are necessary in order
to derive the risk-neutral moments as per equations (1.12) through (1.14). However,
as explained by Castagna (2010) and Reiswich and Wystup (2009), the conversion
of the implied volatility quotes to market prices can be complicated by two features.
First, the inconsistencies in the numeraire currency for diﬀerent fx pairs, as shown
in table 3.4, complicates the conversion from delta to strike. The delta of a currency
option is the percentage of foreign currency one must buy when selling the option in
order to hold a locally hedged position (in the same way as one would buy stock to
delta hedge for an equity option). When the US dollar is not the numeraire however,
the premium for the option is also paid in foreign currency; as Reiswich and Wystup
point out, this is like paying for a stock option in shares of stock. As a consequence,
this amount must be deducted from the standard delta that would be quoted if the
US dollar were the numeraire currency, and the industry convention is to quote this
premium-adjusted delta in these cases, which slightly compounds moving from delta
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to strike. The second complication is the conversion from implied volatility to price
once the strikes have been determined. Standard practice in previous academic papers
has been to solve equations (1.3) and (1.4) for the put and call implied volatilities
σδc and σδp, then plug into the Black-Scholes formula to arrive at the call and put
prices. As pointed out by Castagna and Reiswich and Wystup, this procedure is valid
only for small levels of the risk-reversal.12 Given that the market volatility starting
in July of 2007 caused risk-reversal implied volatilities to become quite large, using
this procedure is inappropriate for the sample considered in this paper. Instead, I
12Castagna (2010, p. 116) gives a detailed explanation of this point and how the strike prices
should be correctly calculated in practice. The standard practice in previous literature has been to
solve (1.3) and (1.4) for the put and call implied volatilities σδc and σδp, then plug into the Black-
Scholes formula to arrive at the call and put prices, so that (using the 25δ quote as an examle):
σ25P = σATM +BF25δ − 0.5rr25δ
σ25C = σATM +BF25δ + 0.5rr25δ
However, this is not fully consistent with the market conventions for trading the butterﬂy. When
giving a quote on a butterﬂy, the risk-reversal price is not given at the same time; there is only
one average implied volatility given (the ﬁrst term in equation (1.4)). The market convention is
to calculate the two 25 delta wing strikes for the butterﬂy by using this single volatilty, denoted
σBF = σATM + BF25δ such that the two butterﬂy strikes are calculated using the same implied
volatility:




T − tΦ−1 (0.25erf t + 0.5σ2BF (T − t))}




T − tΦ−1 (0.25erf t + 0.5σ2BF (T − t))} (1.5)
whereas when a risk-reversal is quoted, the two strikes should be calculated using two diﬀerent
implied volatilities:




T − tΦ−1 (0.25erf t + 0.5σ225P (T − t))}




T − tΦ−1 (0.25erf t + 0.5σ225C(T − t))} (1.6)
Since σBF diﬀers from σ25P and σ25C only by
rr
2 , the strikes will be nearly equivalent for small
levels of the risk-reversal. Castagna illustrates an iterative procedure whereby one determines an
equivalent butterﬂy price with which to build the volatility smile, satisfying the constraints
C(K¯25C , σ(K¯25C)) + P (K¯25P , σ(K¯25P )) = C(K¯25C , σBfly) + P (K¯25P , σBfly)
rr = σ(Kc)− σ(Kp) (1.7)
The result will be two implied volatilities, σ25P = σATM + Bflye,25δ − 0.5rr25δ, σ25C = σATM +
Bflye,25δ+0.5rr25δ which I use along with the at the money implied volatility to construct the smile
via the vanna-volga method.
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use the procedure outlined in Castagna (2010) to extract the 10 and 25 delta put and
call option prices.
I consider implied volatilities for the US dollar versus the Euro, Japanese yen,
Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, Swedish Krona
and Norwegian Krone. I also consider the non-US cross rates of the Yen versus the
Euro and Australian dollar to test if these are responsive to US announcements. The
sample begins between January 1999 and January 2002 depending on the currency
pair (shown in Table 1.2) and runs until July 2009.13 Over the course of the sample,
the Japanese Yen has been the lowest yielding currency while the Australian and
New Zealand dollars (AUD and NZD) have been the highest yielders. Appreciation
in the AUD and NZD, especially versus the Yen, is often attributed to an increase
in `global risk appetite' by the ﬁnancial press and often in response to events that
happen in the US. Recently, Edwards and Plumb (2009) ﬁnd that the AUD/JPY and
AUD/EUR spot exchange rate tends to react to US economic releases, especially in
times of high volatility. Conversely, appreciation of the Yen versus other currencies
is often attributed to an increase in `global risk aversion' by the press. Ranaldo
and Soderlind (2009) document that the Japanese Yen exhibits `safe-haven' eﬀects,
appreciating in times of crisis in the US. I consider these crosses to investigate whether
these hypotheses are reﬂected in the options market.
Data on the spot rates of the corresponding currency pairs is obtained from
Olsen and Associates (described further below), and is taken at 6:00 PM New York
time in order to match the option quotes. Domestic and foreign interest rates are
proxied by tom/next interest rates downloaded from Datastream. These data are
used to convert the options data from implied volatilities and deltas to prices and
strikes.
13There are certain dates in the sample for which option prices are missing, about 2.5% of obser-
vations for each sample, even after accounting for holidays. Some dates are due to unanticipated
events (e.g. 9/11) while others appear to be due to light trading (e.g. December 26). I remove these
dates from the sample.
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The market implied volatilities of the overnight options are calculated using
'calendar time' (7 days per week). As a result, the Friday implied volatilities are
quoted to be over three days rather than one day. To adjust the implied volatilities
and standard deviations from calendar time to a market day basis, in the subsequent
analysis I rescale each Friday's value by
√
Tc/Tm, where Tc is the number of calendar
days to expiration (equal to 3 for a Friday) an Tm is the market days to expiration,
consistent with Ederington and Lee (2001). The convention in the overnight currency
options market is to give weekends a weight of 0.1 rather than 0 to account for the
occasional news event over the weekend that would cause Monday's opening price to
be quite diﬀerent than Friday's close. Therefore, each Friday quote is multiplied by√
3/1.2.
Given a cross-section of ﬁve option implied volatilities on each day, I follow
the method of Jurek (2009) in order to extract a series for the standard deviation,
skewness and kurtosis of each day's option implied distribution. The method consists
of interpolating between the ﬁve option implied volatilities on each day in order to
obtain a continuum, i.e., derive the implied volatility skew, using the Vanna-Volga
method. Given this continuum, a daily time series of option implied moments can be
constructed utilizing the method of Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan (2003). In the next
section, I describe this method in detail.
1.3.2 Extracting the Moments of the Option Implied Distri-
bution
In order to describe the option implied distribution, I use the method of Bakshi,
Kapadia and Madan (2003) to extract the volatility, skewness and kurtosis of the
distribution on each day. The method has the advantage of being model free in that
it does not specify a process for the underlying asset. Carr and Madan (2001) show
that any payoﬀ function H(S) of an underlying asset S with bounded expectation
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can be replicated by a continuum of out of the money calls and puts (where in this
case S is equal to the underlying spot exchange rate). If the payoﬀ function is twice-
continuously diﬀerentiable, it can be spanned algebraically as














and H[S¯], HS[S¯] are the values of the payoﬀ
function and its derivative evaluated at some value S¯, and HSS(K) is the second
derivative of the payoﬀ function evaluated at the strike price K. By the absence of










HSS[K]C(t, τ ;K)dK + (1.10)
S¯∫
0
HSS[K]P (t, τ ;K)dK (1.11)
where rd is the domestic interest rate, C(t, τ ;K) is the time t price of a call on the
exchange rate with strike K expiring at time τ and P (t, τ ;K)dK is the analogous
expression for the put price. Equation (1.9) indicates that the payoﬀ H(S) may be
replicated by a combination of three asset classes: a position in a zero-coupon bond
equal to H[S¯] − S¯HS[S¯], a position in the spot exchange rate equal to HS[S¯] and a
position that is a linear combination of out of the money calls and puts (indexed by
K) with positions given by the weights HSS[K].
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Equation (1.9) gives a method for extracting the moments of the option implied
distribution. Deﬁne the τ period return on the underlying asset as Rt,τ = ln[St+τ/St].
14Carr and Madan (2001) point out that equation (1.9) can be interpreted as a Taylor expansion
around S¯ (ignoring the discounting): the ﬁrst two terms give the tangent to the payoﬀ at S¯ while
the last two terms bend the tangent to conform to the payoﬀ.
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The values of the non-central moments of the distribution can be found by setting
H(S)=(Rt,τ )
n and pricing them via equation (1.9), then removing the discounting.
These results can then be manipulated to obtain the desired central moments. The
resulting expressions for the τ period risk-neutral variance, skewness and kurtosis,
are given by
V ar(t, τ) = erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2 (1.12)
Skew(t, τ) =
erτW (t, τ)− 3µ(t, τ)erτV (t, τ) + 2µ(t, τ)3
[erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2]3/2 (1.13)
Kurt(t, τ) =
erτX(t, τ)− 4µ(t, τ)erτW (t, τ) + 6erτµ(t, τ)2V (t, τ)− 3µ(t, τ)4
[erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2]2 (1.14)
where the above equations as well as the expressions for V,W,X and µ are derived
in the appendix.
Given a cross-section of currency options at diﬀerent strikes quoted on each
day, equations (1.12), (1.13) and (1.14) allow me to extract a daily time series of the
variance, skewness and kurtosis of the option implied distribution. The model-free
variance (1.12) in particular is useful as it utilizes information from options at all
strikes available on each day rather than relying only on the at the money implied
volatility.15
In order to derive the risk-neutral moments of the option implied distribution
as per equations (1.12)-(1.14) a continuum of put and call option prices is required,
while the data set consists of a limited number of option prices on each day. I use
the Vanna-Volga method of Castagna and Mercurio (2007), a common procedure in
the foreign exchange options market, to price a continuum of options in between
the available strike prices in order to derive the complete implied volatility skew at
each date. Given three quoted implied volatilities on any given day at ﬁxed levels of
moneyness, Castagna and Mercurio (2007) show how to price options between them in
15This is equivalent to the model-free implied volatility derived by Britten-Jones and Neuberger
(2000) and expanded upon by Jiang and Tian (2005).
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order to obtain a level of implied volatility (and consequently an option price) for any
level of moneyness. The method rests on a replication argument whereby in addition














as is necessary when volatility is stochastic. In order
to construct a replicating portfolio in this case, three traded options are required in
addition to the underlying spot rate of the plain delta hedge. Once these three option
quotes are available, it is possible to construct a replicating portfolio in order to price
an option at any level of moneyness and then invert the price to obtain to obtain the
corresponding implied volatility. More speciﬁcally, given three traded options with
implied volatilities σ1, σ2, σ3 and strikes such that K1 < K2 < K3, Castagna and
Mercurio show that the implied volatility σ(K) for an option at any strike K can be
approximated by:
σ(K) = σ2 +
−σ2 +
√


























d2(K) = d1 − σ
√
τ
I use this method to construct the implied volatility smile for each currency
pair. While the more liquid 25 delta out of the money quotes are available throughout
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the sample, for certain currency pairs the further out of the money 10 delta quotes
are only available a few years in. When only the 25 delta quotes are available, I set
K1 = K25δp, K2 = KATM andK3 = K25δc and then extrapolate the implied volatilities
up to the 10 delta levels on both sides16. Where the 10 delta quotes are available, I
use the corresponding 10 delta strikes for K1 and K3 and use the Vana-Volga method
to price the options between them. Following Jurek (2009) I append ﬂat tails beyond
the 10 delta levels, as Castagna points out that extrapolation beyond the ten delta
strike levels may become unreliable.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 give the resulting average implied volatility functions, where
I normalize each by the at the money implied volatility on each date. The smiles
exhibit various degrees of asymmetry depending on the currency pair. In general,
currency pairs with large interest diﬀerentials over the sample period such as the
Swiss franc, Japanese yen, Australian and New Zealand dollars tend to exhibit more
skewness in their smiles. The AUD/JPY pair which had the largest interest diﬀer-
ential over the sample period displays particularly large levels of implied volatility in
its wings.
16Jurek (2009) uses a ﬁrst order approximation to the Vanna Volga procedure and cautions against
extrapolating based on this method due to the possibility of violating arbitrage restrictions. Here
however I use a second order approximation which Castagna and Mercurio have since derived in
order to deal with this issue, and that has been shown to be accurate in extrapolating at least until
the 10 delta strikes.
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Figure 1.1: Average implied volatility smiles for each currency pair considered, derived
using the Vanna-Volga method. Implied volatilities have been normalized by their
contemporaneous at-the-money implied volatility. The absolute value of the put delta
is displayed on the x axis. The data is daily and ranges from between January 1999
and January 2002 to June 2009, depending on the currency pair.
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Figure 1.2: (Continued): Average implied volatility smiles for each currency pair
considered, derived using the Vanna-Volga method. Implied volatilities have been
normalized by their contemporaneous at-the-money implied volatility. The absolute
value of the put delta is displayed on the x axis. The data is daily and ranges from
between January 1999 and January 2002 to June 2009, depending on the currency
pair.
Table 1.2 presents the sample statistics for the at the money implied volatil-
ity quotes as well as the derived standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for each
currency pair. All of the moments are highly persistent. Consistent with the observa-
tions of Carr and Wu (2007), the skewness displays a high degree of variation, often




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I collect data on the historic release dates of 10 US macroeconomic announce-
ments from Bloomberg. The announcements are chosen to capture the broad state
of the economy while also covering those indicators thought to be important to ex-
change rate determination by theory. They include the consumer price index, the
producer price index, scheduled FOMC policy rate announcements, housing starts,
non-farm payrolls, retail sales, the trade balance, the current account balance, the
ISM manufacturing index, GDP (advance release) and the Treasury International
Capital System (TIC) data on cross-border portfolio investment ﬂows. Table 1.3
shows the number of announcements for the sample of January 1999 to July 2009
(the sample matching the option data) and their distribution across days of the week.
The most announcements occur on Friday, with the least occurring on Monday. Note
that retail sales announcement dates are only available from March 2000, and the
TIC data is only available from December 2003.
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total
Housing Starts 3 45 40 20 15 123
CPI 0 23 49 19 34 125
Payrolls 0 0 0 4 121 125
Retail Sales 5 27 20 32 29 113
ISM 55 14 18 19 17 123
Trade Balance 1 26 26 36 34 123
TIC 21 14 11 9 12 67
GDP (Advance) 0 0 9 10 22 41
Current Account 5 7 9 11 9 41
Fed 1 51 33 3 0 88
PPI 0 35 8 29 50 122
Total 91 242 223 192 343 1091
Table 1.3: The number of announcements considered, divided across days of the week.
Sample includes January 1999 to July 2009, with the exception of retail sales which
begins in March 2000 and TIC which begins in December 2003. TIC denotes the Trea-
sury International Capital System (TIC) data on cross-border portfolio investment
ﬂows.
Given that the underlying assets are exchange rates, it is important to consider
foreign announcements as well as domestic ones. For each country, the dates of a set
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of economic announcements are collected from Bloomberg with the intention of cap-
turing the same broad state of the economy as in the US. These announcements are
summarized in Table 1.3. The literature on the ex-post reaction of spot rates has been
mixed as to whether foreign announcements tend to matter as much as US ones. An-
dersen et. Al. consider ex-post German announcement eﬀects on the Deutschemark
and Euro spot rates using high-frequency data and ﬁnd that German announcements
eﬀects tend not to be signiﬁcant. In a similar paper looking at ex-post eﬀects James
and Kasikov (2008) consider a broader range of foreign announcements and ﬁnd that
Euro-Zone, Japanese UK and Swiss announcements do not tend to cause much move-
ment in the ex-post respective exchange rates versus the US dollar, while Australian,
Canadian and Norwegian announcements do tend to be signiﬁcant. Including these
foreign announcement dates not only controls for the foreign announcement eﬀects
but also allows me to investigate whether option prices tend to react to these as much
as they do to US ones.
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Figure 1.3: Summary of the type, number and time of release for each foreign an-
nouncement considered.
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1.4 The Ex-Ante Response of the Option Implied
Distribution to Anticipated Announcements
The short tenors of the overnight options data make it possible to reasonably
isolate the eﬀect of an anticipated announcement on the implied distribution. For ex-
ample, one might measure the perceived importance of a given announcement for the
underlying currency by quantifying the increase in the implied volatilities of options
right before the days on which announcements occur. Let IVt denote the implied
volatility of an option at time t, and consider the case of an overnight option. Since
this option expires at 10AM then for all US releases with the exception of the Fed,
such an option, when purchased the night before an announcement, expires the next
day shortly after the announcement has taken place. We would consequently expect
this option to be relatively expensive, or its implied volatility to be higher, if either
the market expects a large move on the day of the announcement or if agents are
risk-averse and particularly dislike such a move. The implied volatility IVt, which
is observed completely before the announcement, can be interpreted either as the
relative weight that agents put on the ability of the announcement to cause future
movements in the underlying exchange rate or a measure of 'announcement uncer-
tainty'. Figure 1.4 illustrates the timing.
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Figure 1.4: An illustration of how overnight options relate to announcements. If an
announcement occurs on the morning of date t, the relevant option that spans this
announcement is purchased the night before. The implied volatility of this option is
denoted by IVt.
The level of implied volatility IVt provides an ex-ante measure of the increase
in uncertainty due to the upcoming announcement. Given a cross-section of strikes for
overnight options on this day, one can similarly study the movement in the skewness
and kurtosis of the state-price density prior to each news release.
The ex-ante impact of the scheduled announcements on the overnight option
implied distribution can be estimated by the following regression for each of the ﬁrst
four moments of the implied distribution (denoted by γ), for each separate currency
pair k:













βk,jDOWj + βk,lγ¯Qt−1 + et (1.16)





i is a dummy variable for US announcements equal to one if announce-
ment i occurs during the life of the option quoted at time t, Dforeignu is an analogous
dummy variable for the relevant foreign announcements for each currency pair as per
Table 1.3, DOWj is a dummy variable for each day of the week from Tuesday to
30
Friday (I drop Monday in order to include a constant in the regression), and γ¯Qt−1 is
the average of the relevant moment γ from the previous 5 days. A lag of the 5 day
average of the left hand side variable is used to account for the observed autocorre-
lation while also controlling for day of the week eﬀects in the lags. For the non-US
crosses (Euro/Yen and Aussie/Yen) the regressions include announcements in both
countries as well as the US announcements. Note that the FOMC announcement
is not included in these regressions as it occurs outside of the time spanned by the
options. The New Zealand announcements are also not included for the same reason.
Turning ﬁrst to the model-free implied volatilities, Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.7 sepa-
rately present the coeﬃcients for the US announcements, the foreign announcements,
and the remaining variables respectively from equation (1.17) where the left hand
side variable is equal to the option-implied standard deviation, γt = σt. As shown in
Table 1.4, the most consistent US announcement eﬀect is a rise in implied volatility
prior to the payrolls release. Implied volatilities are on average between one and two
percentage points higher prior to the release for all US crosses. This eﬀect supports
previous literature in ﬁnding that the payrolls announcement is the most signiﬁcant in
aﬀecting exchange rate volatility. The US payroll announcement signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the Euro/Yen implied volatilities prior to its release, while the eﬀect on the Aus-
tralia/Yen cross is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. On a broad level, this gives evidence
of non-US exchange rates reacting to US economic news. More speciﬁcally however,
the results in linking the Australian and Japanese crosses to US announcements are
suggestive in light of the literature on the forward premium puzzle. The yen has been
the prominent funding currency in the carry trade over the sample period considered,
while the Australian dollar was a popular investment currency. Movements in the
yen and the Australian dollar were often attributed by the ﬁnancial press as a re-
sponse to global risk aversion. From an academic perspective, Lustig and Verdelhan
(2007) show that carry trade returns can be attributed to compensation for consump-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the carry trade. If for example the non-farm payroll announcement is considered an
important indicator of the state of the US economy (which may relate to a 'global
factor' considering its size) and possibly able to foreshadow times of low consumption
growth, one might expect carry trade returns (and thus especially the yen and the
Australian dollar over our sample period) to react to this announcement.
The CPI is the next most signiﬁcant US announcement eﬀect, signiﬁcantly
increasing implied volatility in four of the nine US crosses considered. Given the
tight link between inﬂation and interest rates, for example in a Taylor rule speciﬁca-
tion, one would expect the anticipation of a CPI announcement to increase expected
volatility. Although the PPI is released ﬁrst, it does not appear to have a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on implied volatility. The trade balance announcement is signiﬁcant for
only one of the currency pairs considered. This ﬁnding is somewhat surprising con-
sidering the concern over the sample period of the sustainability of the US current
account deﬁcit and its impact on the dollar. It also contradicts the previous literature
using exchange-traded currency options such as Kim and Kim (2003) and Madura
and Tucker (1992) who ﬁnd that trade balance announcement signiﬁcantly aﬀect im-
plied volatility. Continuing with this theme, the quarterly current account deﬁcit
announcement is never signiﬁcant in our sample, but this is not necessarily surprising
since the monthly trade balance provides more timely information on the level of the
current account. The TIC announcement of US cross-border ﬂows is also not found to
be signiﬁcant, despite the concern over foreign capital inﬂows (especially from China)
propping up the dollar in the past few years, but the number of TIC announcement
dates available at 67 is relatively small compared to the others. In fact, apart from
the payroll and CPI announcements, the remaining US news releases do not tend to
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on option implied volatilities.
The fact that the implied distribution is aﬀected only by payroll and to a lesser
extent CPI announcements on the US side is suggestive in light of a central bank that
follows a Taylor rule type speciﬁcation. As the payroll announcement is generally
33
considered the ﬁrst major indication of the state of the economy over the previous
month, it can be viewed as providing information on the output gap coeﬃcient to the
Federal Reserve. While the CPI reveals new information on inﬂation, core CPI is not
very volatile and the Fed may have other sources of inﬂation data. In contrast, there
may be much more uncertainty surrounding the health of the economy, on which the
payroll announcement provides information. Revisions on inﬂation and output gap
data are expected to feed through to the Fed's policy rate and consequently aﬀect
the exchange rate.
The subset of foreign announcements that tend to increase implied volatility
for the options spanning their occurrence tend to vary with the exchange rate con-
sidered, as shown in table (1.5). For example, central bank interest rate target an-
nouncements do not tend to be signiﬁcant in increasing implied volatilities for Japan,
Switzerland or Sweden17. In general, scheduled announcements in Japan, Norway
and Sweden do not tend to increase uncertainty with the exception of the Norwegian
interest rate announcement. In contrast, scheduled announcements in Canada and
Australia are quite signiﬁcant in increasing uncertainty, and the announcements that
matter (inﬂation, employment and the interest rate) tend to mirror the ﬁndings for
US announcements. These results can be interpreted in line with James and Kasikov
(2008), who ﬁnd that Euro-Zone, Japanese and Swiss announcements do not tend to
cause much movement in the ex-post respective exchange rates versus the US dollar,
while Australian, Canadian and Norwegian announcements do tend to be signiﬁcant.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on the foreign announcements are all
much lower than those for the US payroll announcements. Finally, Table 1.7 shows
that the implied volatilities tend to exhibit signiﬁcant day of the week eﬀects and
conﬁrms that implied volatility is highly persistent.
The results for the equivalent regression (1.17) using the absolute value of
17This may not be as surprising for Japan which kept its interest rate unchanged at a low level


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































option implied skewness as the left hand side variable are given in Table 1.8 for
the US announcements. I use the absolute value of skewness in this speciﬁcation
since as pointed out by Beber and Brandt, there is no reason to expect the implied
distribution to become more positively or negatively skewed generally in anticipation
of an announcement, although later on I use the signed value of skewness when
studying the conditional response to the content of the news. Unlike the volatility
results, with the exception of the payroll announcement implied skewness does not
tend to react to the anticipation of an announcement. Prior to the payroll release
skewness tends to increase for the Euro/USD, Australia/USD and New Zealand/USD
pairs only, i.e., toward a depreciation of the US dollar with respect to these currency
pairs. Skewness is not aﬀected by the CPI announcement. Almost none of the foreign
announcements have any eﬀect on implied skewness and consequently I do not report
the results in order to save space.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 give the results of equation (1.17) for the implied kurtosis.
Implied kurtosis tends to decrease prior to the scheduled announcements. This eﬀect
is strongly signiﬁcant for the payroll announcement as well as many currency pairs
for the CPI. There is also a signiﬁcant eﬀect for four of the currency pairs prior to the
trade balance announcement. Table 1.10 shows that this eﬀect is signiﬁcant for many
of the foreign announcements as well, especially those for which implied volatility was
shown to increase.
A decrease in implied kurtosis prior to scheduled announcements is the opposite
of what one might expect, especially if the announcement is capable of causing a large
jump in the currency. Combined with an increase in implied volatility, a decrease in
implied kurtosis suggest that although an announcement increases uncertainty and
consequently the currency is expected to be more volatile, it decreases the 'bounds'
in which the currency is expected to move. That is, many possible outcomes for
the expected spot rate are likely, but within a narrower range, as the tails of the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































against attributing announcement risk premia to jump risk. If jump risk was the
main concern of agents around announcements, the risk-neutral distribution should
overweight the possibility of large movements in the exchange rate, increasing the
kurtosis of the implied distribution. The fact that implied volatility increases while
kurtosis falls suggests that although agents may still be averse to announcement
induced movements in the exchange rate, these movements are within a narrower
range on average than those on days with no announcement - a puzzling result.
1.4.1 Ex-Post Response of the Option Implied Distribution to
Scheduled Macroeconomic News
The previous section has shown that in anticipation of the US payroll and to a
lesser extent CPI announcement, as well as certain foreign announcements, the option
implied standard deviation tends to rise while the implied kurtosis tends to fall. In
the next section I document the ex-post response of the moments of the implied
distribution, ﬁrst purely to the announcement having occurred and then conditional
on the news content of the announcement.
1.4.1.1 Unconditional Ex-Post Response
In order to ascertain the eﬀect of an announcement occurring on the option
implied distribution after its release, it is suﬃcient to run an analogous regression
(1.17) moving the timing of the left hand side variable forward in order to use the
observation γt+1 from the options quoted on the evening immediately following the
announcement:













βk,jDOWj + βk,lγ¯Qt + et (1.17)
I include the FOMC announcement in this speciﬁcation. The FOMC announcement












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consequently, the implied moments considered are derived from options beginning
a few hours after the announcement has already occurred.18 The regression (1.17)
allows me to test whether the impact of the announcement occurring is suﬃcient to
aﬀect the implied distribution going into the next day. Table 1.12 summarizes the
results for the FOMC as well as other select US announcements.
For every US currency pair and for the Euro/Yen cross, the release of the
FOMC statement tends to increase implied volatility into the next evening, despite
the option being quoted four hours after the announcement. This result is evidence
of a volatility spillover or 'meteor shower' eﬀect stemming from the release of infor-
mation, as discussed in the literature on information linkages in the foreign exchange
markets.19 There are a number of reasons as to why the FOMC announcement might
be particularly unique in terms of causing volatility spillovers. First, the federal re-
serve announcement in some ways is much more subject to interpretation based on
the released statement rather than the announced rate in itself. Unlike many of the
other announcements where the headline number tends to tell most of the story, there
is rarely much uncertainty as to the actual interest rate change leading up to the Fed-
eral Reserve meeting. Economist survey data provided by Money Market Services,
a standard industry source (discussed further below) shows only ﬁve times over the
course of our ten year sample wherein the Fed's interest rate change did not meet
survey expectations. The full statement however, which is much more subjective to
interpret, may take time to fully aﬀect the market. Second, the timing of the FOMC
announcement along with the resulting spillover in implied volatility may be evidence
of informational linkages in the foreign exchange markets, as discussed for example
by Melvin and Melvin (2003) and Cai et al. (2008). Foreign exchange is a unique
asset class in that it is traded around the clock, albeit centered in major centers gen-
18Similarly, we now include New Zealand announcements which occur in between 10AM and 6PM
New York time.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































erally classiﬁed as 'America' (centered in New York), 'Europe' (centered in London)
and 'Asia' (centered in Tokyo). Previous literature has found evidence that currency
volatility tends to spill over across these regions. The volume of foreign exchange
trading varies and is highest during the times in which European trading overlaps
with 'Asian' and 'American' trading, corresponding to the hours between 3AM and
11AM New York time (Berger et al., 2009). The FOMC announcement therefore oc-
curs at a time of relatively low market liquidity, unlike the other US announcements
considered whose eﬀects have time to play out prior to the close of the European
market. Consequently, in some ways the overseas markets open to the FOMC news
and the timing of the implied volatility quote IVt+1 which is captured at 6PM as the
Asian markets open is an ideal measure of any FOMC spillover eﬀects. The increase
in this implied volatility in response to the FOMC announcement found here lends
support to the hypothesis of informational linkages in the foreign exchange markets,
as found in the previous literature. In particular, it suggests that such scheduled
news may be a cause of these volatility spillovers across regions and the observed
persistence in foreign exchange volatility.
The ISM announcement is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in implied
volatility in the period following its release for four of the US currency pairs, a point
I return to below. Similarly, implied volatility tends to increase on average following
the GDP release for four of the pairs, despite not displaying any signiﬁcant eﬀect
in the ex-ante regressions above. In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant ex-post eﬀect
associated with the payrolls announcement.
Similar to the previous results, implied kurtosis tends to fall in response to an
FOMC announcement, even as implied volatility increases. Implied skewness again
does not display any clear pattern, with the exception of the Australian and New
Zealand dollars for which skewness tends to increase upon the release of the Fed
announcement. For the other announcements the higher moments in general do not
display any signiﬁcant eﬀects, suggesting that the main response of the option implied
46
distribution is exhibited by movements in volatility.
1.4.1.2 Conditional Response of the Implied Distribution to the Content
of News
Although the previous section has shown the unconditional response of the
implied distribution to news announcements, the response will likely also vary de-
pending on the content of the particular announcements upon release. Agents have
expectations as to the content of the news releases, and so the deviation of the an-
nounced value from the anticipated value, or the 'surprise', may be the main avenue
by which agents revise expectations. As such, one would expect the option implied
distribution to react accordingly.
Testing the conditional response requires a measure of announcement surprises.
I obtain median forecast values of each US economic release considered from Money
Market Services (MMS). Every Friday MMS polls approximately 40 economists and
market strategists as to their forecasts for the economic announcements in the week
ahead. The MMS forecast data have been widely utilized in the announcement lit-
erature (see for example Beber and Brandt (2006), Andersen et al. (2002), Faust et
al. (2007)) and have been shown to contain predictive information as to the under-
lying indicator as well as being unbiased20. Following this literature I construct the




where Akt is the realized value of the economic indicator released in announcement k
at time t, Xkt denotes the corresponding median survey forecast and σk is the (uncon-
ditional) empirical standard deviation of the innovations Akt−Xkt. Standardizing the
surprise by σk serves two purposes. First, it makes it possible to compare the mag-
nitude of the surprise between diﬀerent announcement types. Second, it allows the
20Using Bloomberg forecasts rather than MMS forecasts in the analysis produces similar results
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slope coeﬃcients in the regressions below to be interpreted as the magnitude of the
impact of a one standard deviation announcement surprise on the dependent variable.
Table 1.13 gives the average standardized surprise Skt for the US announcements.








Table 1.13: Average value of the surprise on each announcement day divided by its
sample standard deviation, Skt =
Akt−Xkt
σk
.* indicates that the average surprise is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero over the sample at the 5% level.
Unlike other asset markets such as equities, the anticipated eﬀect of the sign
of the surprise on the exchange rate is not clear for many announcements and often
depends on the underlying macroeconomic environment. For example, Clarida and
Waldman (2008) show that a positive surprise to CPI often causes an appreciation of
the US dollar, while in other cases too much inﬂation might be expected to lead to a
depreciation of the currency. Consequently, I begin by documenting the reaction of
the option implied moments to the absolute value of the surprise in each announce-
ment. This shows the overall reaction of the moments to the surprise regardless of
direction and avoids having to separate between 'good' and 'bad' news. To gauge the
conditional response of overnight implied volatilities to the surprise in the announce-
ment, the following separate regression is run for each announcement k and moment
γ:
γQt+1 − γQt = αk + βk|Skt|+ ekt (1.18)
where the change in the implied moment corresponds to the options quoted on the
day after the announcement less the options that span the announcement itself. Since
48
the absolute value of the surprise is taken as the right hand side variable, the con-
stant cannot be immediately interpreted as the average change in the option implied
moment after the announcement. Given that αˆk = γ
Q
t+1 − γQt − βˆk|S¯kt|, I report the
average change in the implied moments, γQt+1 − γQt , in the regression tables. I Tables
1.14 through 1.18 give the results.
From Table 1.14, the negative intercepts for the payroll announcement indicate
that the event of an announcement causes implied volatility to fall in the next day on
average.21 However, the positive slope coeﬃcients show that this eﬀect is dampened
by the content of the news, with implied volatility following less on average the larger
the content of the surprise. For the ISM announcement, while implied volatility
tends to fall on average upon its release as well, a larger surprise oﬀsets this eﬀect
and causes implied volatility to spill over into the following day. Unlike the results
above, the trade balance shows signiﬁcant announcement eﬀects here, with implied
volatility tending to increase in response to its release but with this increase being
dampened for certain currencies the greater the surprise.
The results for implied volatility are more or less mirrored in the higher mo-
ments, as shown in Tables 1.16 and 1.18. The event of a payroll announcement leads
to a fall in implied skewness and an increase in implied kurtosis; for most currencies
the level of the sup rise is insigniﬁcant. Implied skewness increases in response to an
ISM release, and falls signiﬁcantly in response to a GDP release.
To further investigate the conditional reaction of implied volatilities to the
news in the announcement and allow for asymmetric eﬀects of 'good' versus 'bad'
news, a regression with diﬀering slope coeﬃcients to distinguish between positive
versus negative surprises is run for each announcement and each currency pair:
γt+1 − γt = αk + βhkSktDht + βlk|Skt|Dlt + et (1.19)
Where Dht is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the surprise Skt is positive




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Dlt is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the surprise is negative. To make
interpretation easier I take the absolute value of the negative surprises.22
Turning ﬁrst to the payrolls announcement, it can be seen from the intercepts
that as in equation (1.24) the occurrence of the announcement leads to a signiﬁcant
drop in implied volatility. However, the reaction is asymmetric depending on the
content of the news. More job losses than expected, or bad news, dampens the drop
in implied volatility that tends to occur after the announcement, while good news does
not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect. A one standard deviation surprise to the downside
leads to an increase of between one and half and two and half percentage points in the
option implied volatilities. Unlike the results of the ex-ante regressions, the content
of the news does not matter for the non-US crosses. The higher order moments are
not aﬀected in general by the content of the news, although the kurtosis does tend to
fall in response to bad news in two cases.
The ISM regression is an interesting case. Unlike payrolls, the occurrence of
bad news has the strongest eﬀect on the volatility rather than the occurrence of the
announcement in itself. The slope coeﬃcient βl is positive and strongly signiﬁcant for
four out of the eight US currency pairs. Moreover, it dwarfs the negative intercept
in all cases meaning that a lower than expected ISM reading will increase foreign
exchange volatility into the night after its release. One potential explanation is that
the timing of announcements is important for the foreign exchange market. The ISM
index is the ﬁrst available indicator on the state of the economy over the previous
month. Although it focuses mainly on the manufacturing sector, a negative surprise
on the ISM may foreshadow worse than expected changes in other subsequent indica-
tors (especially the payroll release that follows shortly afterward) and as such it may
be logical that bad news increases volatility.
22Running the same regression without the absolute value results in exactly the same coeﬃcients
but with the sign reversed on βlk. Taking the absolute value of the negative surprise makes the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5 The Behavior of the Physical Distribution Around
Announcement Dates
The analysis thus far has focused on the behavior of the risk-neutral distribu-
tion q(St, St+n) around scheduled macroeconomic news releases. As pointed out by
Beber and Brandt (2006), a natural way to proceed would be to conduct an identical
analysis of the physical distribution p(St, St+n) around each announcement and com-
pare these to the risk-neutral movements in order to back out shifts in the stochastic
discount factor, and thus movements in the risk premium:
The most natural approach to disentangling changes in the beliefs
from changes in the preferences of market participants is to complement
the analysis of the risk-neutral spd [state-price density] presented above
with an analysis of the physical pdf (and noting that preferences make up
the diﬀerence between the two).
While the option implied distribution can be extracted on each day from a cross-
section of strikes which yields a daily time series of moments, having exchange rate
data only at the daily frequency would make it impossible to do the same for the
physical pdf. However, given the short time frame of the overnight options considered
and the fact that there is no overlap between the maturities of options issued on each
day (every day a new option is quoted and it expires before the next quote is captured),
the physical distribution p(St, St+n) can be approximated by looking at the moments
of intraday returns. To exploit this fact, I obtain high-frequency spot exchange rate
data at 5 minute intervals and use the data to estimate the ex-post realized moments
of the physical distribution over the lifespan of the overnight options, using recent
methods suggested by Andersen et al (1998, 2000, 2001, 2003) and Barndorﬀ-Neilsen
and Shephard (2002). Manipulating the intraday data in this way yields an analogous
daily time series of the realized moments to the time series of risk-neutral moments
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studied in the previous section. Therefore, I ﬁrst conduct an equivalent analysis
on the unconditional and conditional response of the realized moments to scheduled
news releases by running the identical regressions on the realized moments in order to
contrast the behavior of the physical distribution to event risk. I then use the daily
realized volatility estimates to study the volatility risk premium around the scheduled
announcements and compare its behavior to a benchmark of days where no scheduled
announcements occur.
1.5.1 Realized Volatility and Higher Moments
A series of inﬂuential papers by Andersen et al (1998, 2000, 2001, 2003) and
Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and Shephard (2002, 2004) establish the concept of realized vari-
ance in modern econometrics. The concept is to utilize high frequency (intraday)
data in order to construct a non-parametric estimator of the variance. Under this
framework, the variance is no longer latent and can be treated as an observable vari-
able.
Let st denote the log exchange rate on day t. If intraday data is available at
frequency N so that st can be sampled N times per day, the daily realized variance





where ri,t = si,t − si−1,t. For example, if exchange rate quotes are available at a
frequency of every 5 minutes throughout the 24 hour day, then N = 288 observations
per day and ri,t is the log diﬀerence between the exchange rate quotes observed 5
minutes apart from each other. If the underlying exchange rate process follows a
price process with stochastic volatility
dst = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)
then the realized variance estimator RVt converges in probability to the integrated
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variance of the process as the sampling frequency N increases. That is, the realized








Although in theory the intraday data should be sampled as frequently as possi-
ble, issues begin to arise when exchange rates are sampled too frequently due to mar-
ket microstructure aspects such as bid-ask bounces, nonsynchronous trading, round-
ing errors and misrecordings (see for example Hansen and Lunde (2005) and the
references therein). Andersen et al (2001) argue that sampling exchange rates at 5
minute intervals is optimal as it keeps the accuracy of the continuous time assump-
tion, while being long enough to prevent microstructure frictions from aﬀecting the
measurements.
As pointed out by Amaya and Vasquez (2010), it is possible to extend the
results on realized variance to construct estimators of higher order moments as well.


















These results for calculating the daily realized moments of the return distri-
bution are particularly useful for this study as they allow me to extract a daily time
series of the physical moments (volatility, skewness and kurtosis) that matches the
time frame of the risk-neutral moments derived from options. With these values in
hand, I can conduct an analogous study of the behavior of these physical moments




The construction of the realized moments utilizes intraday exchange rate data,
purchased from Olsen and Associates. The full data set consists of bid and ask
quotes on the euro, Swiss franc, Japanese yen, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar,
New Zealand dollar, Norwegian krone and Swedish krona versus the US dollar, in
order to match the options data set. The EUR/JPY and AUD/JPY crosses are
constructed synthetically from this data by triangular arbitrage.
In practice, quotes do not arrive at ﬁxed time intervals, and the underlying
raw data consists of many quotes from seconds apart during peak times of market
trading to longer stretches at quiet times. In order to facilitate time series analysis,
these quotes must be transformed into a homogeneous series at equally spaced time
intervals. This involves choosing a time frequency at which to sample the data and a
method to obtain quotes at exactly these times from the raw data series. Following
Andersen and Bollerslev (2001) the data are transformed into observations at equally
spaced 5 minute intervals by linearly interpolating between the two closest ticks at
each 5 minute time stamp. As well, the data set does not contain observations on
weekends, deﬁned as 21:00 GMT on Friday to 21:00 on Sunday. Finally, I remove the
Christmas and New Year's holidays from the data set. This leaves me with 737,280
quotes per currency pair, and over 7 million quotes spanning the entire data set.
The bid and ask spot rate quotes are transformed into 5 minute log returns
by ﬁrst taking the average of the log of the bid and ask quotes and then diﬀerencing
this to come up with the return series. This method is presented in Dacorogna et
al (2001) and utilized by Andersen et al (2001); its advantage is that if x is the
USD/JPY price for example, then the JPY/USD price is given by −x. As a result,
statistical results based on absolute diﬀerences of x (such as volatility) remain the
same regardless of the way the pair is quoted, which would not be true if the log of
the arithmetic average of the bid and ask quotes was taken.
Although the foreign exchange market is in theory a 24 hour, 7 day market, in
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reality the market eﬀectively closes on the weekend, from the close of New York on
Friday to the open of Asia on Sunday. To reﬂect this fact, observations from 21:00
GMT on Friday to 21:00 GMT on Sunday are removed from the sample;consequently,
realized volatility cannot be computed over this period. Hansen and Lunde (2005)
propose a number of procedures to correct the realized volatility for market closures.
Although their motivation is to calculate realized volatility in the equity market,
which closes overnight on each day, the same methodology can be applied to account
for the weekend period in the FX markets. I correct the Friday to Monday realized
volatility calculations by adding the closed to open squared return to the realized












where r2cto,t denotes the squared return from the last observation on Friday to the
ﬁrst observation on Monday. This has the eﬀect of incorporating information into the
Friday to Monday volatility that may have occurred while the market was closed, as
often important news or events may occur over the weekend that aﬀects the level of
volatility when the market re-opens. 23 Table 1.23 presents the descriptive statistics
for the realized volatility, skewness and kurtosis over the sample period as calculated
by equations 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22. The moments are taken over the period of 6PM New
York time to 10AM the next day, in order to match the tenor of the options. Realized







and is annualized. The realized skewness and kurtosis given by 1.21 and 1.22 are
scaled to one day through multiplying by
√
N and N respectively.
23Hansen and Lunde propose a more sophisticated estimator to account for market closures which







t , where the weights are chosen to minimize the conditional
bias of the estimator. However, in their sample it is necessary to remove outliers in order to ﬁnd
weights that are sensical, and it is unclear how the outliers should be chosen. When applied to this
foreign exchange data series, I ﬁnd the method to be extremely sensitive to outliers and the amount
of outliers that are removed. Consequently, I opt to use their alternative proposed method of adding
the squared return over the market closure period.
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Realized volatility is highly persistent and exhibits a high degree of variation
over the sample, as do the realized skewness and kurtosis. The realized skewness
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in any case, and often switches signs. The
realized kurtosis estimates are extremely large, indicating that the average overnight
return distributions tend to be very fat-tailed, but there is an enormous amount of
variation in the realized kurtosis over the sample. Comparing the realized moments
to the option implied moment sample statistics presented in Table 1.2, we can see ﬁrst
that the average implied volatility is much greater than the average realized volatility
over the course of the sample, suggesting evidence of a volatility risk premium in the
overnight options markets. This point is explored in greater detail below. The aver-
age implied skewness is much more negative than the realized skewness, suggesting
that market participants are willing to pay a premium on average to insure against
downside moves in the exchange rates considered. For the currencies popular in the
carry trade over the sample considered, in particular AUD, NZD and JPY, the signs
and magnitudes of the implied skewness versus the realized skewness imply that there
is a premium for downside protection against unwinds in the carry trade. Interest-
ingly, The realized kurtosis is much higher than the risk-neutral kurtosis, although it
also exhibits much more variation and much less persistence.
1.5.3 Preliminary Analysis
In the section that follows, I conduct identical regressions on the ex-ante re-
sponse of the realized moments to scheduled macroeconomic news as was performed
above on the risk-neutral moments, in order to distinguish between the behavior of
the risk-neutral versus the physical pdf. It is instructive however to look at the means
of the risk-neutral versus the realized moments on select announcement days versus
non-announcement days ﬁrst, to give a basic contrast of the two distributions. Table
1.24 reports the averages of the risk-neutral and realized moments on US announce-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































days. Non-announcement days are deﬁned as days where none of the announcements
considered occur in either country (or in the case of the non-US crosses, in all three
countries).
The implied volatility is generally much higher than the realized volatility on
announcement and non-announcement days alike. This fact suggests evidence of a
large volatility risk premium in the overnight options market, although it is not clear
that event risk is a main driver. I return to this point below.
1.6 Realized Moments Around Announcement Days
The short tenors of the option implied moments combined with the high fre-
quency exchange rate data allows an analogous investigation of the behavior of the
realized moments on announcement dates as was done on the implied moments in the
previous section. The realized moments above are taken over the same time frame
spanned by the overnight options. This allows me to isolate the ex-post response
of the realized moments over the equivalent period on each announcement day. If
agents' expectations are rational, the realized distribution should correspond on aver-
age to the forecasts of the subjective density (see for example Bliss and Panigirtzoglou
(2004)). I begin by recalculating regression (1.26) on the realized moments. This gives
a measure of the behavior of the physical pdf around the news releases irrespective of
the content of the news. Comparing the behavior of the realized moments to that of
the implied moments above gives an idea of whether the magnitudes and signs of the
movements in the implied moments around these announcements are due to beliefs as
to the directional movement in the exchange rate or reﬂect premia paid for insurance
against movements deemed undesirable.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































βk,jDOWj + βk,lγ¯t−1 + et (1.23)
where γPk,t denotes either the realized overnight volatility (
√
RVt), skewness (Skwt)
or kurtosis (kurtt) calculated over the same time as that spanned by the options.
Table 1.26 gives the values of the slope coeﬃcients on the US announcement dummy
variables.
The payroll announcement is once again by far the dominant US news release
in terms of aﬀecting the realized volatility, which is as much as two percentage points
greater than average over these periods. What is surprising is that the estimated
coeﬃcients for the realized volatility are remarkably similar to those of the implied
volatility from the equivalent regression in Table 1.4 above. This result suggests that
the option market is pricing in the anticipated movement in actual volatility; the
volatility risk premium is rather small. Given that the average implied volatility over
all days in the sample is much higher than the realized volatility (Table 1.23) this
result suggests that event risk is not a primary driver of the volatility risk premium,
even given the short tenors of these options.
The only other announcement that is consistently statistically signiﬁcant in
raising realized volatility is the trade balance announcement. This is true despite
the fact that implied volatility is only signiﬁcantly higher around the trade balance
announcement for one case (Canada). Conversely, the implied volatility around the
CPI announcement tended to be signiﬁcantly higher, while the realized volatility
around the CPI is never signiﬁcant. It seems that agents are willing to pay a premium
to insure against movements in the exchange rate around CPI announcements even
though realized volatility does not tend to be higher on average around these days
in reality. On the other hand, the market does not demand a premium to insure
against movements in the exchange rate due to the trade balance announcement
despite realized volatility tending to be signiﬁcantly higher on these days. It seems
70
that agents are more risk averse to movements in volatility stemming from inﬂation
than from the trade balance. In a Taylor rule type framework, this may be due to
the fact that a shock to inﬂation feeds directly into the interest rate, and therefore
the exchange rate, whereas the eﬀect of a shock to the trade balance on the exchange
rate may be perceived as less direct by market participants.
Aside from the GDP announcement, which increases volatility in four curren-
cies, no other US announcement has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on realized volatility over the
life of the option. Despite previous studies having found signiﬁcant moves in volatility
during a short window surrounding the announcement, it seems that the announce-
ment eﬀect for the other news releases diminishes over this longer time frame.
Table 1.27 presents the reaction of realized volatility around the subset of for-
eign news announcements. Once again, the reaction of volatility to news tends to be
most common in Canada and Australia. However, it appears that the implied volatil-
ities (as per Table 1.33) tend to understate the realized volatilities in these countries,
with the exception of the Australian current account and retail sales announcement.
Therefore, it does not appear that announcement risk is driving the volatility risk
premium in the non-US news releases either. Realized volatility tends to be signif-
icantly higher on interest rate announcement days in almost all countries, with the
exception of Japan and Switzerland.
Table 1.29 shows the behavior of the absolute value of realized skewness around
US announcement days. Unlike the option implied skewness which changed signif-
icantly only for the euro, Australian dollar and New Zealand dollar on the payroll
announcement date, the reaction of realized skewness is much larger and tends to
be highly signiﬁcant around both the US payroll and trade balance announcement.
In eﬀect, the signiﬁcance of the realized volatility around these announcements is
mirrored in the reaction of the skewness. The results for the foreign announcements
(Table 1.30) indicate that realized skewness moves signiﬁcantly for many of the non-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The behavior of the realized kurtosis around US announcement dates is pre-
sented in Table 1.32. Once again the most signiﬁcant move is found in the payroll
announcement, followed by the trade balance. There tends to be an extremely large
increase in the realized kurtosis of the physical distribution around payroll announce-
ment dates, in contrast to the implied kurtosis results found in Table 1.9 which tends
to fall in anticipation of the announcement. The same pattern is observed for the
trade balance announcement, albeit with lesser magnitude: realized kurtosis is signif-
icantly higher on these days while implied kurtosis falls (although the implied kurtosis
coeﬃcient is not often signiﬁcant). As well, the realized kurtosis tends to signiﬁcantly
increase around the US GDP announcement for many currency pairs. The pattern of
behavior for the implied versus realized kurtosis is reﬂected in the foreign announce-
ments as well, as shown in Table 1.33, with realized kurtosis tending to increase
signiﬁcantly around those days that were shown to cause a signiﬁcant decrease in the
implied kurtosis.
1.6.1 Reaction of Realized Moments Conditional on News Sur-
prises
The previous section has shown that the unconditional response of the realized
moments around scheduled news releases diﬀers from the ex-ante movement in the
risk-neutral moments shown in section 4. The realized moments tend to react to the
US trade balance and GDP announcements in addition to the payroll announcement,
and do not react to CPI announcements. In addition, the movement of the higher
order realized moments is diﬀerent - realized kurtosis increases prior to these news
releases while the risk-neutral kurtosis was shown to fall. In this section, I examine
the conditional response of the realized moments to the content of the news releases,
again replicating the previous analysis for the risk-neutral moments. I begin by

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































γPt+1 − γPt = αk + βk|Skt|+ ekt (1.24)
where γP denotes the realized variance, skewness or kurtosis. This allows me to
contrast the reaction of the realized moments to the magnitude of the surprise in the
announcement Skt with the reaction of the risk-neutral moments shown in section 5.
The results are presented in Tables 1.35 through 1.39.
The event of a payroll announcement leads to a drop in the realized volatility,
irrespective of the news, as shown by the terms ∆
√
RVt+1, although the drop in the
realized volatility is generally smaller than that for the implied volatility shown in
Table 1.14. Similar to the results for the implied volatility, realized volatility does
not tend to react to the content of the payroll announcement - it is the event of
the announcement itself that tends to matter. The ﬁt of the regression around the
payroll announcement is generally very poor. In contrast, the reaction of the realized
volatility around the trade balance announcement does tend to depend on the news
content. The slopes are signiﬁcantly negative for four of the currency pairs considered,
meaning that the higher the (absolute) level of the surprise, the more the realized
volatility tends to fall into the day after the announcement. The same pattern was
seen for the implied volatility, although the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients here are
larger. Unlike the results seen for the implied volatility, realized volatility does not
tend to react at all to the ISM announcement.
The movement in realized skewness (signed here) does not depend at all on the
content of the payroll announcement. The constant terms are also all insigniﬁcant,
unlike those for the risk-neutral skewness where the event of a payroll announcement
was associated with lower skewness of the option implied distribution going into the
next day. However, the realized kurtosis does tend to react to the content of the
trade balance announcement. For the euro and New Zealand dollar, a larger value
of surprise in the trade balance announcement is associated with a more negatively
skewed distribution, while for the franc, krone and krona the skewness tends to in-
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crease. The patterns on the signiﬁcance and signs of the coeﬃcients match those of
the risk-neutral skewness, indicating that the risk-neutral and physical distributions
tend to move in the same direction. Realized kurtosis tends to fall by a large amount
in the day after a payroll announcement, unlike implied kurtosis which was shown
to rise and to a much lesser degree (Table 1.18). The results are similar however in
that realized kurtosis also does not tend to react to the content of the announcement.
Unlike the other realized moments, there is no signiﬁcance at all for realized kurtosis
around the trade balance announcement.
To once again allow for asymmetric eﬀects of 'good' versus 'bad' news, a regres-
sion with diﬀering slope coeﬃcients to distinguish between positive versus negative
surprises is run for each announcement and each currency pair on the realized mo-
ments, analogous to equation (1.19) above:
γPt+1 − γPt = αk + βhkSktDht + βlk|Skt|Dlt + et (1.25)
Where Dht is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the surprise Skt is positive
and Dlt is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the surprise is negative. To make
interpretation easier I take the absolute value of the negative surprises.
The reaction of realized volatility to the payroll announcement still does not
depend at all on the content of the news, regardless of whether the news is good or
bad. This result diﬀers from the implied volatility, as shown in Table 1.20, which
tends to increase in response to bad news. Interestingly, bad news on the payroll
announcement leads to a strengthening of the dollar on average, as shown by the
reaction of realized skewness, versus the euro, Swiss franc and Swedish krona, while
for the franc and krona good news causes the dollar to fall. Realized kurtosis is
only sensitive to the content of the payroll release for the Australian dollar and the
euro/yen cross - in these cases, kurtosis tends to fall relatively less in response to bad
news than in response to good news. A lower than expected release for the ISM leads




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































insigniﬁcant. This implies that the ISM only tends to matter when it surprises to the
downside, similar to the results seen for implied volatility. The higher order realized
moments are not eﬀected by the ISM release.
Unlike the results seen in Table 1.35 for the risk-neutral moments, the realized
moments tend to react strongly to the content of the trade balance news release. A
lower than expected reading on the US trade balance causes realized volatility to fall,
and interestingly, causes the dollar to rise into the day after, as shown by the realized
skewness. A lower than expected reading also causes realized kurtosis to drop for four
of the currency pairs considered.
1.7 The Volatility Risk Premium
The previous sections have shown that the risk-neutral implied volatility tends
to be much larger than the realized volatility over the course of the sample. If investors
are averse to volatility in the underlying exchange rate they will be prepared to pay
a premium for insurance against volatility, causing the implied volatility to be higher
than the realized volatility under the physical probability measure. This volatility risk
premium is generally measured as the diﬀerence between the risk-neutral volatility
and the realized volatility: σQt −
√
RVt. Many papers document the existence of the
volatility risk premium in equity markets (e.g. Bakshi and Kapadia (2003)), while
Low and Zhang (2005) show the existence of a volatility risk premium in the foreign
exchange market using longer term currency options.
In this context, it is useful to investigate the size of the volatility risk premium
in the overnight currency options market, and whether this risk premium is driven
by scheduled news. For example, one might expect the volatility risk premium to be
higher around macroeconomic news releases, especially payroll announcements, given
the results above. In this section, I both document the existence and magnitude of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































do this in two ways. First, I summarize the magnitude of the volatility risk premium
on announcement days versus a benchmark of non-announcement days, and then run
a regression to investigate how the volatility risk premium changes around the an-
nouncements. Second, I construct a basic trading strategy wherein one sells volatility,
in the form of overnight straddles, around payroll announcement days and compare
the proﬁt from this strategy to that of selling straddles around non-announcement
days.
Table 1.44 reports summary statistics on the overnight volatility risk premium
(the diﬀerence between the implied and realized volatility) for each currency, both
over the whole sample and for select announcement dates. The volatility risk premium
is generally large across all currencies, with a high degree of variation. The t-statistic
in the third column reports the value of the test statistic from a two-sided t-test of the
equality of the means of the implied volatility series versus the realized volatility series
in each currency. The hypothesis that the means of the two series are equal is very
strongly rejected for every currency pair. The second and third panels of the table
report the average volatility risk premium on announcement days versus a benchmark
of days wherein no announcement occur in either country. While the premium is high
on select announcement days, it does not appear to be of much greater magnitude
than the premium on non-announcement days. The table suggests that scheduled
macroeconomic event risk may not be a primary driver of the overnight volatility risk
premium.
To investigate this idea more formally, I run a regression equivalent to equations
(1.26) and (1.23) of the volatility risk premium on dummy variables corresponding to
the US and foreign announcement dates:
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for each currency. The results, reported in Table 1.46, conﬁrm the hypothesis that
the overnight volatility risk premium is not generally signiﬁcantly higher around an-
nouncement days. This is a surprising result given the short tenors of the options
considered. The result is logical however given the separate equivalent regressions on
the implied volatility and realized volatility from Tables 1.4 and 1.26. While those
tables showed that both the implied and realized volatility tend to increase around
payroll announcement days for example, it was noted that the magnitude of the in-
crease is quite similar. It follows that the diﬀerence between them (given by the
volatility risk premium here) is not necessarily signiﬁcantly higher on the announce-
ment day.
The evolution of the volatility risk premium over the sample is plotted in Figure
1.5. Note that while the implied volatility tends to be greater than realized volatility
for most of the sample, there are generally periodic jumps in the graphs where realized
volatility eclipses the implied volatility. These rare but periodic occurrences are
suggestive of the idea behind implied volatility being expensive; agents are willing
to pay a premium for volatility protection in the overnight options market precisely
to protect against such situations.
1.7.1 The Forecasting Ability of Implied Volatility and Up-
ward Bias
As mentioned in the introduction, many studies have found implied volatility
to be a fairly good predictor of realized volatility. However, implied volatility tends
to overstate realized volatility, a ﬁnding that is often attributed to the volatility risk
premium. A common way to test the forecasting ability of implied volatility is to run
the Mincer-Zarnowitz type regression (see for example Patton and Sheppard, 2009):
√
RVt = α + βσ
Q










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where RVt denotes the ex-post realized volatility and σ
Q
t denotes the option implied
(risk-neutral) volatility. If the implied volatility is an unbiased forecast of realized
volatility, estimation of the above regression should yield estimates of α = 0 and
β = 1. As well, a high R2 would indicate that the implied volatility is a good
estimator of the subsequent realized volatility.
Although an extensive investigation of the forecasting ability of implied volatil-
ity in the foreign exchange market will be left for future work, the above regression
is relevant here as the estimated constant and slope coeﬃcients are informative as to
the existence and magnitude of the volatility risk premium. There are three relevant
cases to consider. First, accepting the joint hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 1 would
provide evidence against a volatility risk premium; in this case, the implied volatility
would be purely a reﬂection of agents forecasting higher realized volatility in the next
period. Second, accepting the hypothesis that β = 1 but ﬁnding that α < 0 would
suggest that a volatility risk premium exists, but is constant over time. Finally, a
ﬁnding of 0 < β < 1 that is statistically signiﬁcant gives evidence of a time-varying
volatility risk premium. In this case, the high implied volatility is only partially be-
ing reﬂected in the actual realized volatility over the life of the option. Bollerslev
and Zhou (2006) show formally that when the asset price process is represented by a
Heston type model24, the slope coeﬃcient in equation (1.26) will be less than 1.
Table 1.47 reports the results of regression (1.27) over the full sample, the
payroll announcement date observations only and the non-announcement days. The
fourth column of each panel denotes the p-value obtained from a Wald test of the joint
hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 1. In all cases, the slope coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
24A stochastic volatility model in which volatility is modeled as an independent process and is
allowed to be correlated with the asset price process:
dSt = (µ+ λSVt) dt+
√
VtdBt
dVt = κ (θ − Vt) dt+ σ
√
VtdWt
corr (dBt, dWt) = ρ
100
less than one, giving further evidence of a time-varying volatility risk premium. The
hypothesis that the implied volatility is an unbiased estimator of realized volatility
is strongly rejected in every case. The R2 over the full sample are reasonably high
in most cases, indicating that despite the upward bias, the implied volatility does a
fairly good job in forecasting realized volatility. This is much less true on payroll
announcement days (although the sample is much shorter), suggesting that the risk
premium may make up more of the magnitude of the implied volatility quotes.
Tables 1.48 and 1.49 report results for equivalent Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions
using the implied and realized skewness and kurtosis, i.e.
Skwt = α + βγ
Q
1,t + et
Kurtt = α + βγ
Q
2,t + et (1.28)
If the option implied skewness is a forecast of future moves in the exchange rate
(for example, if puts being expensive relative to calls, i.e. negative skewness, is a
reﬂection that the market expects the exchange rate to fall) then one would expect a
signiﬁcant positive value on the slope coeﬃcient. On the other hand, if the skewness
reﬂects demand for insurance, the implied skewness may have no relation to the
realized skewness, or may consistently move in the opposite direction. The logic of the
implied kurtosis versus the realized is more similar to that of the implied volatility.
One might expect the option implied kurtosis to be an upward biased forecast of
realized kurtosis, just as in the implied volatility case, if agents are prepared to pay a
premium for protection against kurtosis risk, that is, large moves in the currency in
either direction. In both of the regressions (1.28) the implied skewness and kurtosis
being an unbiased estimate of realized skewness and kurtosis respectively would result
in a ﬁnding of α = 0 and β = 1.
From the results, it appears that neither the implied skewness nor the implied
kurtosis have any predictive power in relation to the realized variables. In the case of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































not a forecast of direction but may reﬂect other factors such as insurance, as stated
above. The results are surprising however, with respect to kurtosis. As can be seen
from the sample statistics in Tables 1.2 and 1.23, the realized kurtosis is in general
much larger than the implied kurtosis, which is the opposite of what one might expect
should a kurtosis risk premium exist. One possibility is that the option pricing model
being used to generate the option quotes is using a distribution that is close to being
Normal, and so understating the realized kurtosis.
1.7.2 Trading Strategy: Proﬁts to Selling Overnight Currency
Straddles around Payroll Announcement Dates
The purchase of a straddle can be thought of as a form of insurance against
exchange rate movements throughout the life of the option. If investors are averse to
such movements they should be prepared to pay a premium for this insurance. Should
the proﬁts to selling straddles around macroeconomic announcements be proﬁtable
on average, this would suggest the existence of a risk premium.
The results thus far have documented that implied volatilities tend to react
most strongly to payroll announcements. The question remains as to whether a risk
premium exists in the underlying exchange rate around this announcement. The pre-
vious section has suggested evidence of a large volatility risk premium in the overnight
currency options market overall, and even more so around payroll announcements.
An alternative test is to design a trading strategy whereby a dealer sells insurance
against exchange rate movements stemming from payroll announcements versus dates
with no announcements.
I take the point of view of an option dealer who sells overnight straddles. This
is done over two diﬀerent samples: one which consists of straddles that cover the date
of a US payroll release and another in which none of the announcements considered























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































suﬃcient movement in the underlying exchange rate in either direction. As such, it
can be viewed as a form of insurance against exchange rate movements. Figure 1.6
illustrates the payoﬀ to selling a straddle.
Figure 1.6: Payoﬀ diagram to the returns of selling a straddle. The realized spot
exchange rate upon expiry of the option is given on the x-axis. The seller proﬁts
if the exchange rate does not move beyond either intersection with the axis upon
expiration, i.e., if there is minimal volatility in the underlying currency as compared
to the option premium.
At the money straddles are the most liquid instruments traded in the foreign
exchange options market. These straddles consist of the purchase of a call and a put
with the same strike price and the same expiry, where the strike price is set equal
to the overnight forward rate. The cost of the straddle is the sum of the underlying
put price and call price. For example, one might request a quote on a Euro straddle
with face value of 50 million Euros, which would entail a 25 million Euro put and a
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25 million Euro call. The broker would then quote one implied volatility spread. The
purchaser would then plug the quoted implied volatility along with an agreed upon
spot reference into the Black Scholes Formula separately for the put and the call to
come up with the currency price of each and then sum them to get the total cost of
the straddle25. Since the straddle is delta neutral, no delta hedge is exchanged.
Consider a dealer who sells an overnight at the money forward straddle. Let
Pt denote the premium received from the sale of the straddle (equal to the cost of
the call plus the cost of the put), ST denote the realized value of the exchange rate
at 10AM the next day and K = Ft,T denote the strike price which is set equal to the
overnight forward rate Ft,T . Let N denote the total face value of the straddle (the
face value of the call plus the face value of the put). The total dealer proﬁt can then
be expressed as
ΠT = Pt −max(ST −K,K − ST , 0)N
2
that is the option premium received less the payout on either call or the put. Only
one of the call or put will ﬁnish in the money, each of which has a face value of N
2
.
To compare payoﬀs across currencies, I arbitrarily set the face amount of the straddle
equal to $2 million US dollars for each pair (that is a combination of a $1 million put
and a $1 million call).
Table 1.50 reports the sample statistics of the proﬁts to this strategy for both
payroll announcement days and non-announcement days. Turning ﬁrst to the payroll
days, the strategy is proﬁtable on average, albeit with a high standard deviation and
occasional large drawdowns for some currency pairs. The proﬁts are all highly sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero, as indicated by the t-statistics. Surprisingly, the proﬁts
for the New Zealand dollar are slightly positively skewed. Taken on their own, these
results would suggest evidence of a large risk premium stemming from the payroll
announcement, linking this risk premium to macroeconomic risk. However, it is nec-
25Only one implied volatility is quoted for both the put and the call since by put call parity, a
call and a put with the same strike price must have the same implied volatility.
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essary to compare these proﬁts to a benchmark of conducting the same strategy on
days wherein no macroeconomic announcements occur in either country. The second
panel of Table 1.50 illustrates the payoﬀs to this strategy. Once again the proﬁts are
all signiﬁcantly positive, although generally smaller than those around the payroll
announcements. This result is in line with the high volatility risk premium on both
announcement and non-announcement days shown in the previous section. These
proﬁts are much more skewed to the downside than those around payroll announce-
ments.
The ﬁnal panel of Table 1.50 reports t-statistics from a test of whether the
average payoﬀ to the two strategies are statistically diﬀerent from each other, using
Newey-West standard errors. The result is that surprisingly, the diﬀerence in the
average proﬁt from selling straddles on payroll announcement days versus selling
straddles on non-announcement days is not statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5%
level, with the exception of the NZD/USD pair. Even for the announcement found
to be the most adept at moving markets, a signiﬁcant portion of the risk premium
remains which cannot be explained by macroeconomic risk, despite the very short
lifespans of the overnight options.26
26Once again, this result cannot be attributed to the fact that the sample covers the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. Calculating the proﬁts to these strategies prior to the crisis (cutting the sample at July 2007)
gives the same result, with the proﬁts to selling straddles around payroll announcement dates only
being signiﬁcantly higher versus non-announcement dates for the Euro, Australian dollar and New
Zealand dollar.
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Proﬁts to Selling Straddles Around Payroll Announcements
Euro Japan Switzerland Canada Australia New Zealand
Average Payoﬀ (USD) 2,052.71 2,054.74 1,152.16 1,502.48 1,052.80 841.59
Std Deviation 5,917.35 4,113.81 4,632.36 2,771.84 2,493.65 1,739.06
t-statistic 3.11 4.06 2.54 5.20 4.50 4.14
Skewness -0.02 -0.27 -0.71 -0.81 -0.09 0.14
Excess Kurtosis 1.45 0.69 0.41 1.53 1.97 0.40
Min -14,936.80 -10,335.64 -13,084.22 -9,270.41 -6,382.64 -3,976.03
Max 23,754.08 14,996.54 9,730.58 6,787.23 9,120.40 5,551.47
Times Positive 67.50% 70.83% 64.10% 73.47% 71.43% 67.68%
Avg Premium Received 8,924.43 6,498.32 6,513.70 5,452.65 3,677.18 2,956.39
Avg Amount Paid Out 6,871.72 4,443.58 5,361.54 3,950.17 2,624.37 2,114.80
Number of Observations 120 120 117 98 98 99
Proﬁts to Selling Straddles on Days with No Announcements
Euro Japan Switzerland Canada Australia New Zealand
Average Payoﬀ (USD) 1,237.07 1,141.59 905.75 1,122.72 412.34 444.94
Std Deviation 4,799.47 3,882.22 3,447.46 2,866.61 2,444.73 1,851.89
t-statistic 10.37 10.70 8.36 11.49 5.38 7.80
Skewness -1.17 -1.00 -0.94 -0.70 -2.35 -1.45
Kurtosis 5.06 5.27 1.42 3.45 16.85 8.28
Min -36,017.95 -32,236.55 -14,452.34 -15,012.84 -22,681.94 -16,639.74
Max 19,215.41 18,624.21 9,751.36 15,282.60 12,406.22 8,414.73
Times Positive 69.07% 67.75% 68.93% 73.59% 65.71% 68.66%
Avg Premium Received 5,510.13 5,258.27 4,826.76 4,254.03 1,780.18 1,341.68
Avg Amount Paid Out 4,087.43 4,098.58 3,908.00 3,121.21 1,436.88 902.22
Number of Observations 1445 1383 1339 1064 1117 1203
t-Statistics for Tests of Equality of Average Payoﬀs for Payroll vs Non-Announcement Strategy
Euro Japan Switzerland Canada Australia New Zealand
t-statistic 1.22 1.77 0.53 1.25 2.60 1.88
Table 1.50: Summary statistics of the payoﬀ to a strategy of selling an overnight
straddle with face value of $2 million US dollars around a payrolls announcement (in
the ﬁrst panel) and on days in which none of the announcements considered in tables
1.4 and 1.3 occur in either country (in the second panel). The t-statistics in the ﬁrst
two panels are from the t-test that the average payoﬀs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, using Newey-West standard errors. Times positive denotes the percentage of
the time that the strategy results in a positive proﬁt. The average premium received
is the average premium that the dealer receives from the sale of the straddle, while
the average amount paid out is the average proﬁt to the buyer from the exercise of the
straddle. The third panel reports the t-statistic from a t-test of whether the average
payoﬀs in each strategy are equal to each other, using Newey-West standard errors.
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1.8 Conclusion
This paper takes a new perspective of measuring the eﬀect of scheduled news
releases on exchange rates by studying the behavior of option implied densities derived
from very short term currency options around both US and foreign macroeconomic
announcement dates. These options are quoted prior to the event actually taking
place, and give a glimpse into agent expectations rather than market realizations, as
well as an indication of which macro events market participants are willing to pay to
hedge against ex-ante. The short lifespan of 16 hours of the options in my data set
allows me to isolate the announcement eﬀect and obtain a fairly clean measure of the
news impact on the entire option implied distribution. Despite a large literature that
documents ex-post reactions of the exchange rate to a multitude of US announcement
types, I ﬁnd that the option implied distribution responds ex-ante mainly to US
payroll announcements, and to a lesser extent the CPI, while a lower than expected
ISM reading can cause implied volatility to increase in response.
Densities derived from option prices are unique in that they scale the perceived
objective probability of future states occurring (i.e. as per the physical pdf) by the
risk aversion of the investor. In other words, they combine investor beliefs toward the
probability of each state occurring with preferences toward each state. As stressed
by Beber and Brandt (2006), by examining the behavior of this implied distribution
around macroeconomic announcements and then comparing to the physical pdf, one
can disentangle investor preferences from beliefs in order to ascertain whether there
exists an announcement risk premium that can be linked to macroeconomic funda-
mentals. By using intraday exchange rate data, I am able to construct the analogous
realized moments to the risk-neutral ones over the life of the option in order to disen-
tangle the eﬀects of news releases on the physical distribution versus the risk-neutral
distribution. I ﬁnd that while the realized moments also tend to increase primarily on
days of payroll releases, the realized volatility is signiﬁcantly higher on trade balance
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announcement days as well, while not being higher on CPI announcement days. This
suggests that agents are willing to pay a premium to insure against movements in the
exchange rate around CPI announcements even though realized volatility does not
tend to be higher on average around these days in reality. On the other hand, the
market does not demand a premium to insure against movements in the exchange
rate due to the trade balance announcement despite realized volatility tending to be
signiﬁcantly higher on these days.
Finally, I ﬁnd evidence of a large volatility risk premium in the overnight
options market, as measured by the diﬀerence between implied and realized volatility.
Surprisingly, only a small portion of the volatility risk premium appears to be linked to
scheduled news releases, despite the short tenors of these options. A strategy of selling
volatility in the form of straddles around US payroll announcements earns proﬁts
that are signiﬁcantly positive, but not statistically diﬀerent in most cases than the
benchmark proﬁts obtained by selling straddles on days wherein no macroeconomic
announcements occur in either country.
Future work is proceeding along two dimensions. The ﬁrst is to investigate the
volatility risk premium more deeply, in particular to explore whether it can predict
the returns to the carry trade when using options of longer maturities, as inspired
by the work of Bollerslev et al. (2006, 2009) in the equity market. The second is
to further analyze the ability of implied volatility to forecast future volatility in the
foreign exchange markets across diﬀerent horizons.
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Chapter 2
The evolution of last-resort
operations in the global credit crisis1
2.1 Introduction
As the global credit crisis was unfolding beginning in 2007, strains began to
appear in various parts of the ﬁnancial system. These boiled over to become severe
disruptions, culminating in the high-proﬁle bankruptcies and bailouts of 2008. The
disappearance of funding liquiditymarket participants' ability to roll over their ma-
turing positionswas one of the key vectors for the transmission of strains through
the system. Such liquidity eﬀects took diﬀerent forms at diﬀerent points in the crisis;
a number of last-resort mechanisms were engaged in response, some private and some
public.
This crisis took place in the context of a secular shift from a bank-loan ﬁnancial
system to a capital-markets ﬁnancial systemthat is, from one based on nontradable
ﬁnancial assets, with banks playing the key intermediary role, to one based on tradable
1This chapter is co-authored with Perry Mehrling and Daniel H. Neilson. The
authors wish to thank Derek Walker for research assistance. We are also grateful for
comments from Zoltan Pozsar, attendees at the 2011 Eastern Economic Association
meetings and seminar participants at UMass Amherst.
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securities, with dealers playing the key intermediary role (Pozsar et al., 2010). In
brief, we argue that the system's response to the crisis can be viewed as moving from
a private lender of last resort, through a public lender of last resort, to a dealer of
last resort. It was the last that was ﬁnally able to stabilize the system, because it is
the function suited to a liquidity crisis in the capital-market ﬁnancial system where
the problems arose. At each stage of the crisis, the inability to reﬁnance challenged
particular parts of the system, but the systemic liquidity issue was the inability of
the market as a whole to reﬁnance the holding of mortgage-backed securities. Such
instruments are at the heart of the capital-markets ﬁnancial system; in such a system,
it is securities dealers that are most vulnerable to the disappearance of liquidity, and
so it is this function that must be assumed by the public sector to alleviate the crisis.
The remainder of this section sets the stage for the analysis to follow by pre-
senting a hierarchical view of the microstructure of money markets, which anticipates
the hierarchy of last-resort operations to be discussed below. The sections that follow
identify the three last-resort reﬁnancing mechanisms and illustrate how they were
engaged during the crisis. The private and public lender-of-last-resort mechanisms
were insuﬃcient, but the dealer-of-last-resort mechanism was ﬁnally able to stabilize
the system.
What broke in late 2006 and early 2007, speciﬁcally, was the system of fund-
ing liquidity that supported the holding of high-tranche mortgage-backed securities
by a variety of diﬀerent entities that, together, comprise the capital-market ﬁnancial
system (what has come to be known as the shadow banking system), described in
detail by Pozsar et al. (2010). Whereas traditional mortgage lending had involved
banks funding individual loans with retail deposit-account liabilities, the new system
involved shadow banks funding mortgage-backed securities with wholesale money-
market borrowing. The key to the system was the use of the securities themselves as
collateral for the borrowing. In this way, the shadow banks were able to fund them-
selves at a near risk-free rate even without government insurance of their liabilities.
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This seemingly limitless supply of cheap funding was the key liquidity element
on the way up; its disappearance was the key liquidity element on the way down.
On the way up, easy funding supported rich asset valuations which in turn provided
collateral for easy funding; on the way down this same feedback mechanism worked in
reverse. On the way up the feedback was hard to see, and the Cassandras who saw it
were easy to ignore (Bezemer, 2009). On the way down, the feedback was both easier
to see and harder to ignore, as we shall show, notwithstanding Taylor and Williams
(2008), among others.
To appreciate how this liquidity element operated, it is crucial to understand
the microstructure of money markets, and in particular their hierarchical character
(Mehrling, 2010a). One symptom of the hierarchy is the tiering of rates, even between
quite similar instruments. In the overnight money market, for example, there are three
main instrumentsEurodollars, Fed Funds, and repoand typically their rates are
arranged as
LIBOR > Fed Funds > RP. (2.1)
Before the crisis, the spread between the rates was normally only a few basis points.
(During the crisis, the spread was much wider.) How should we understand this
pattern?
The place to begin is by appreciating that the repo market is the main source
of funding liquidity for security dealers who supply market liquidity by posting buy
and sell prices for a particular class of securities. When a dealer buys a security, he
typically will use that security as collateral to borrow most of the cash he needs to
settle the trade, perhaps from another dealer who has just sold a security, or perhaps
from a corporate customer who is looking to park funds overnight.
The Fed Funds market, by contrast, is largely an interbank market. A bank
that borrows Fed Funds receives today a deposit at the Fed in return for a promise to
deliver it back, with interest, tomorrow. The rate of interest on Fed Funds is a market
rate, determined by supply and demand, but the Fed watches that rate and attempts
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to keep it close to an announced target by intervening daily in the repo market,
typically lending against Treasury security, more when it wants to lower rates and
less when it wants to ﬁrm them up. For banks with access to the Fed Funds market,
the Fed Funds rate is the marginal cost of funds.
For banks without access to the Fed Funds market, most importantly any
non-U.S. bank, the Eurodollar market is the marginal source of funds, and LIBOR
is the marginal cost of those funds. Both Fed Funds and Eurodollar borrowing are
unsecured, in the sense that there is no explicit collateral, but banks watch their
counterparty exposure closely; in eﬀect, the balance sheet of the counterparty is the
security for the loan, not any particular identiﬁable collateral.
The rates in these three markets are usually held in close alignment by arbi-
trage; agents with access to any two markets borrow at a low rate in one market
and lend at a higher rate in the other. But this arbitrage does not equalize rates
completely. In general the lowest cost of funds is in the repo market, so at any mo-
ment everything that is acceptable collateral for repo is used for repo, with any excess
proceeds lent on in the higher yielding Fed Funds and Eurodollar markets. Similarly,
the second lowest cost of funds is in the Fed Funds market, maintained so by daily
Fed intervention, so again there is an incentive to borrow as much as possible, with
any excess proceeds lent on in the higher yielding Eurodollar market.
All of this market microstructure grew up before there was a shadow bank-
ing system, but the shadow banking system made use of it, and so stresses on the
shadow banking system show up as widening spreads between the various overnight
money instruments. The breakdown of familiar arbitrage relationships across money
markets is the most compelling evidence of the importance of the liquidity element in
the crisis, but once we start looking for such breakdowns we ﬁnd them everywhere.
Indeed, the tiering we observe in overnight money markets is even more evident as
we move out in time, credit quality, and currency. In each of these dimensions, there
are arbitrage relationships that normally keep prices in line with underlying funding
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costs. Typically these arbitrage relationships do not hold exactlysome deviation is
required before arbitrageurs step inbut the direction and size of the deviation con-
stitutes important evidence about the nature of the stresses that the system is dealing
with. Examination of these spreads will form the basis for much of the analysis that
follows.
Figure 2.1 shows the overnight Treasury repo rate and overnight LIBOR as a
spread against the Fed Funds rate. The vertical lines, here and throughout the paper,
indicate the dates that Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed.2 The patterns of
spreads support this periodization of the crisis. In the ﬁrst stage, from August 2007
to March 2008 (Bear Stearns), LIBOR frequently spiked well above Fed Funds, often
at the same time as Treasury repo spiked below Fed Funds. During this period the
Fed was pursuing a policy of daily intervention to stabilize the Fed Funds rate around
its announced target, a target that moved from 5% to 2% (see Figure 2.2).
2Bear was acquired by JPMorgan Chase on March 14, 2008 and Lehman ﬁled for bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008.
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USD overnight rate spreads against Fed Funds
Gov’t repo less FF
LIBOR less FF
Figure 2.1: USD overnight rates, spreads against Fed Funds. The vertical lines mark
the dates that Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers repsectively failed (March 14 and
September 15, 2008).








Federal Funds target and effective rates
Fed funds target
Fed funds effective
Figure 2.2: Fed Funds target and eﬀective rates.
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In the second stage, from March 2008 to September 2008 (Lehman Brothers),
overnight rates reverted towards their pre-crisis norm. The reason for this, however,
was not any lack of stress, but rather the more proactive role of the Fed in absorbing
stresses on its own balance sheet, mainly by swapping MBS for Treasuries using TSLF,
and wider use of its discount facility (augmented by TAF and PDCF). This is the
public lender of last resort. The eﬀect of this intervention on the balance sheet of the
Fed is apparent in Figure 2.3, from March 2008.
In the third stage, after Lehman, money markets broke down completely. The
large deviations of LIBOR and the overnight repo rate from the Fed Funds rate,
visible in Figure 2.1 are not the symptoms of a private lender-of-last-resort-operation,
but rather the complete collapse of private money markets. During this third stage,
the Fed stepped in as dealer of last resort in the money market, standing between
borrowers and lenders who had previously dealt directly with one another in the
money market. This intervention more than doubled the Fed's balance sheet in a
matter of weeks. It also pushed short rates the rest of the way from 2% to 0%, but
it is the balance sheet expansion that is the main thing.
Figures 2.1 and 2.3 oﬀer evidence, in prices and quantities, for our periodization
of the crisis. The argument that follows uncovers the speciﬁc patterns of ﬁnance and
reﬁnance that gave rise to this evidence.
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Figure 2.3: Fed assets (top panel) and liabilities (bottom), January 2007March 2010. Until the end of 2007,
the Fed relied on its usual open-market operations to stabilize markets. In early 2008, it began to establish special
liquidity facilities, which appear on the asset side as a change in the composition of the balance sheet, but not in its
overall size. These changes were expanded after Bear's failure in March 2008. After September 2008, the Fed's balance
sheet expanded dramatically. On the asset side, the expansion was in the liquidity facilities, which were wound down
by early 2010, the proceeds rolled into the MBS purchase program. On the liability side, the expansion was funded by
increased reserves. Note that we have included TSLF on the asset side, though it is accounted for as a memorandum
item on the Fed's published balance sheet.
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2.2 Private lender of last resort
The initial source of stress in late 2007 was the collapse of ABCP funding
for shadow banks' holding of high-tranche MBS. This funding had typically been
arranged with backup lines of bank credit, so that sponsoring banks had to scramble
to ﬁnd funding to honor their credit commitments to their SIVs and conduits. The
scramble was not only about funding, however, but also about risk exposurethe
whole reason for the shadow banking structure had been to get risk oﬀ the balance
sheet in order to avoid the associated capital charges under the Basel capital adequacy
regulations.






















Figure 2.4: Three-month repo rates, spreads against three-month OIS.
One way to do this is in the repo market.3 Figure 2.4 shows Treasury and
MBS repo rates as a spread against three-month OIS. As the crisis began to unfold, a
spread opened up between the two rates. Figure 2.5 gives schematic balance sheets,
3We focus here on term MBS repo, rather than unsecured term ﬁnancing such as CP and Eu-
rodollar, so we can compare secured rates.
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presented as T accounts, for a reﬁnancing operation that illustrates what was going
on.4 Initially, entities such as SIVs5 had ﬁnanced the holding of high-tranche MBS
with ABCP. Money-market mutual funds held this ABCP, along with other assets.
As ABCP ﬁnancing became untenable, repo ﬁnancing oﬀered an alternative, using
the assets as collateral for their own ﬁnancing. Holders of Treasuries, perhaps dealer
banks, could obtain funds by putting them out on repo, and use the funds to ﬁnance
the SIV, accepting the SIV's MBS as collateral. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, in
the pre-crisis norm, MBS repo rates were only slightly above Treasury repo rates,
but during the ﬁrst stage of the crisis, that spread widened to as much as 100 basis
pointsthe steep compensation required by providers of such funds. Dealers here
are acting as private lender of last resort, a service available, at a price, to holders of
good collateral.
4Throughout the paper, we use T accounts to illustrate the changes in ﬁnancial position of various
participants in the money markets. The left column represents assets, the right liabilities. Entries
with signs indicate changes; those without indicate initial positions.
5In this discussion, we focus on SIVs. Similar observations apply to other ABCP-funded entities,
















Figure 2.5: Schematic balance sheets, replacement of ABCP funding. SIVs obtain col-
lateralized repo ﬁnancing against their inventory of MBSs as uncollateralized ABCP
funding dries up. Dealer banks accept this collateral. In turn, they obtain ﬁnancing
against Treasuries. MMMFs, who have become unwilling to hold ABCP, are still will-
ing to lend against Treasury collateral. Dealers rely on securities lenders (not shown)
to swap from the incoming MBS collateral to Treasury collateral. In the ﬁrst stage
of the crisis, the spread between Treasury and MBS repo was at times pushed to 100
basis points to support this private lender of last resort function, though presumably
some of it was captured by the securities lenders.
This mechanism, however, proved to be insuﬃcientthere were too few Trea-
suries in the repo market. What do you do if you don't have a Treasury? What you
need is term funding, but funding is only available overnight. So you can borrow Fed
Funds overnight, relying on the Fed to ensure daily rollover for whatever term you
desire, and lock in your cost of funds with a term overnight index swap.6 The ex post
6There is a version of this trade that uses Treasury repo also, reversing in term and then repoing
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return to such a strategy is shown in Figure 2.6.























Figure 2.6: Return to providing term funds at the OIS rate and funding in the
overnight Fed Funds market. The series is the three-month Fed Funds OIS rate less
the compounded cost of borrowing overnight Fed Funds (at the eﬀective rate for each
day) for the same period. This can also be thought of as the cost of insuring against
movements in the overnight Fed Funds rate.
In eﬀect this is equivalent to buying interest rate insurance, the price of which
is the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed swap rate and the average overnight rate. The cost
of that insurance is therefore a proxy for the pressure for term funding. This proxy
must be interpreted with some care because, during the ﬁrst stage of the crisis, the Fed
pushed down short rates rather quickly, so the ex post cost of insurance may be larger
than the ex ante cost. Normally, the insurance cost is negative; there is typically a
slight inversion of the short term money rate term structure so that term funding
out overnight. The problem is getting the collateral back when you need to close out the reverse.
That might be one way of understanding the episode of Treasury fails. It is all very well to have a
free overnight loan, but not if it means you have to extend your term lending!
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is cheaper than overnight funding. In the crisis this pattern reversed dramatically,
in both the ﬁrst and third stages. Ex post, speculators who were willing to borrow
overnight and lend term were rewarded handsomely, suggesting unusual pressure to
ﬁnance term borrowing. (Note that the expectations hypothesis fails both in good
times and in crisis times, though the failures are in the opposite direction.)





















Figure 2.7: Repo outstanding, primary dealers. Though term repo borrowing was
stable from mid-2004, overnight and continuing repo borrowing expanded by another
$1.5 trillion. Both fell after Bear's failure and collapsed after Lehman's.
Securities dealers also provided a third way out for SIVs and conduits who
could not roll over their maturing ABCP. Figure 2.7, based on data from the Fed's
survey of primary dealers, shows that these were willing to continue to take on an
ever-larger inventory of securities, ﬁnanced in the repo market, right up until Bear's
acquisition by JPMorgan Chase. All of the expansion in the years leading up to the
crisis was ﬁnanced with overnight repo. Figure 2.8 illustrates this mechanism. A
dealer, in general, makes a two-way market, oﬀering buy and sell prices and proﬁting
on the spread between them. The dealer minimizes their own inventory by adjusting
124
prices to match buy and sell orders. When faced with a one-sided order ﬂow, the
dealer absorbs it, relying on the repo market to ﬁnance their position. Indeed we
see that, up until Bear's collapse, dealers held a steadily increasing short position in
overnight MBS repo (Figure 2.9)dealers were absorbing the banking system's exit












Figure 2.8: Schematic balance sheets, dealer absorbing one-sided order ﬂow. The
dealer uses the MBS themselves as repo collateral, relying on the repo market for
reﬁnance. Wealth holders are unwilling to hold ABCP but are willing to lend in the
repo market against MBS, at least overnight.(Mehrling, 2010b).
125



























Figure 2.9: Primary dealer net ﬁnancing by collateral type and term. Net ﬁnancing is
securities in less securities out (contra Adrian and Fleming (2005)) so as to show net
borrowing of money as a negative number, analogous to our presentation of balance
sheets. Note that term repo against corporate securities (red) appears as a net positive
position until about August 2007, after which it becomes a net negative position.
We have illustrated three private-sector mechanisms that facilitated, from late
2007 to March 2008, shadow banks' reﬁnance of (or graceful exit from) their MBS
position. Lending in the repo market, supported by securities lending, earned a big
spread for those able to provide it (Figure 2.1). Term lending funded with overnight
Fed Funds earned a big term preimum for others (Figure 2.6). And dealers continued
to absorb an exit from MBS as prices fell. The failure of Bear Stearns, however,
marked the end of these private last-resort actions. Term funding disappeared and
dealers stopped dealing. It became clear that the private sector would not be able to
provide reﬁnance any longer.
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2.3 Public lender of last resort
Prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve's response to the
turmoil in the money markets had been largely limited to reductions in the Fed Funds
rate in support of the private mechanisms of reﬁnance discussed above. After Bear's
failure, the private money markets began to break down. Treasury collateral had
become scarce, with other forms of collateral (MBS in particular) now commanding
large haircuts, only eligible for exchange against much smaller quantities of funds
and often being refused altogether. By getting Treasuries into the markets, the Fed
sought to alleviate this problem and restore liquidity.
Now the Fed exhibited classic lender-of-last-resort intervention, in which it
sold oﬀ its holding of Treasury bills and lent the proceeds to the private ﬁnancial
system. Although the size of the Fed's balance sheet did not change in this period, its
composition changed signiﬁcantly with the creation of a number of liquidity programs.
These can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2.3 (p. 118). Here we focus on the Term
Securities Lending Facility, the Term Auction Facility, and the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility.
The TSLF was introduced on March 11, 2008, three days before Bear's collapse.
It allowed primary dealers to bid a fee in order to borrow Treasuries from the Fed
for a period of up to 28 days against less liquid securities, in particular agency debt,
agency residential MBS and investment-grade private-label residential MBS. In this
way, dealers could now swap non-Treasury collateral for Treasuries with the Fed.
TSLF allowed banks with MBS to obtain Treasuries, which could then be put out on
repo out in order to continue to ﬁnance their positions.
By providing good collateral against questionable collateral, the Fed was fulﬁll-
ing the role that securities lenders had played in the private repo-market reﬁnancing
mechanism that had held up through the ﬁrst stage of the crisis (see Figure 2.5, p.
121). Dealers could continue to provide ﬁnancing against MBS by swapping the in-
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coming collateral with the Fed for Treasury collateral, which was acceptable to the
ultimate providers of funds.
The TSLF was eﬀective in restoring liquidity to the markets, as argued among
others by Fleming et al. (2010); borrowing from the TSLF resulted in a net increase in
the quantity of Treasury collateral in the market and a net decrease in the quantity
of other collateral. An increase in the supply of Treasury collateral should reduce
its scarcity value and therefore cause Treasury ﬁnancing rates in the repo markets
to increase. Similarly, by removing less liquid collateral from the market (such as
agencies and MBS), the supply of this collateral should decrease and push down the
repo rates on non-treasury collateral. Fleming et al. (2010) show that the TSLF was
indeed eﬀective in narrowing repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid
collateral, although the eﬀect came primarily through the increase of Treasury repo
rates rather than a fall in agency and MBS repo rates. This can be seen in Figure
2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Overnight repo rates, spreads against government-collateral repo. The
spreads spike in the ﬁrst stage of the crisis, but become smaller and less volatile with
the Fed's intervention in the second stage.
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was a second program aimed at alleviating
stress in the money markets. Like TSLF, TAF accepted illiquid securities as collateral.
Unlike TSLF, it provided additional reserves directly to banks. Thus TAF essentially
provided anonymous discount-window lending.
As described by Cecchetti(2008), TAF was a series of auctions of reserves for
relatively long periodsterms of 28 or 35 days. These were funded by sales of the
Fed's outright securities holdings, leaving the total size of its balance sheet unchanged.
Any US commercial bank was eligible to bid.
The rules of the Term Auction Facility allowed banks to pledge collateral that
was considered illiquid at the time and had little market value in private transactions.
Thus TAF became another method for the Fed to lend against collateral that banks
could not have used to obtain funds otherwise. TAF has been deemed successful
in improving liquidity by such authors as Wu (forthcoming) and McAndrews et al.
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(2008), though see Taylor and Williams (2009) for a dissenting view.
Just as TSLF moved the ﬁrst avenue for private reﬁnance onto the balance
sheet of the Fed, TAF can be seen as replacing the secondthe provision of term
funds against overnight Fed Funds borrowing (see Figure 2.6, p. 122). Through TAF,
rather than ensuring overnight reﬁnance to providers of term funds as in the private
version, the Fed itself provided the term funding (uncertainty was great enough at
the time that a 28-day loan should be thought of as such).
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) sought to replace seized-up repo
markets by providing overnight loans (of money) to dealers against questionable col-
lateral. Though not as large a program as TSLF or TAF, PDCF is important for
two reasons. First, it acknowledges that in a capital-market ﬁnancial system, the
role played by securities dealers is essential, and that when dealers themselves fail to
fulﬁll it, they must supported or supplanted. Second, PDCF previews the even more
dramatic interventions that were to come after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
We think of PDCF as supporting the third of the private-market reﬁnancing
mechanisms (Figure 2.8, p. 124). Where the dealers had been able to borrow against
MBS in the repo market, now they borrowed from the Fed.
Figure 2.11 summarizes these public lender-of-last-resort operations in schematic
balance sheets. At the bottom left is the Fed's, showing the pattern we saw in Fig-
ure 2.3 (p. 118)a change in composition of Fed's assets without an overall balance-
sheet expansion. Such interventions succeeded in stabilizing repo markets and in


















Figure 2.11: Schematic balance sheets, public lender of last resort ﬁnancing. As
wealth holders attempt to liquidate a position of MBSs, dealers must absorb the one-
sided order ﬂow. The Fed supports this with various liquidity facilities. PDCF lends
directly to dealers, while TAF provides funds to banks. The Fed funds these loans by
selling Treasuries.
2.4 Dealer of last resort
The events of that month, especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the
rescue of AIG, demonstrated that lender of last resort operations were insuﬃcient.
Revulsion had spread from mortgage-backed securities to structured ﬁnancial prod-
ucts more generally, and interbank lending came to a halt as ﬁrms waited in fear
of another major bankruptcy. At the core remained the issue of mortgage-backed
securities. The Fed expanded its balance sheet dramatically, holding outright $1.25
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trillion in agency MBS by 2010. The result, within a few months, was the return of
measures of liquidity and market distress to more normal levels, which neither private
nor public lender of last resort actions had achieved. How should we understand the
Fed's ﬁnal intervention? Why did it succeed where its previous attempts had failed?
To understand what was done, look ﬁrst at Figure 2.3 (p. 118). Policy steps
through September 2008 altered the composition, but not the overall size, of the Fed's
balance sheet. The Fed's stock of Treasury securities was sold (or swapped, in the
case of TSLF) to fund the various liquidity facilities. No change was needed on the
liability sidereserve balances. Interventions in the third stage were diﬀerentthe
Fed expanded its own balance sheet dramatically in a short period of time. On the
liability side, it is clear that the expansion was funded, in the end, with increased
reserve balances. The asset side is more complicated, and is our focus in this section.
We approach it in two parts, the ﬁrst lasting from September 2008 until early 2009,
and the second continuing until the present.
At ﬁrst, the existing liquidity facilities were expanded in roughly equal propor-
tions. Funded by an expansion of reserves, the Fed expanded TSLF, TAF, and PDCF,
as well as the central bank liquidity swaps (discussed below) and the CPFF. Allowing
this expansion of its own balance sheet is characteristic of a securities dealerthe
Fed was eﬀectively borrowing from banks, by the creation of new reserves, to extend
credit to many classes of participants in the money markets. It was providing money
(TAF, PDCF) or good collateral (TSLF) against a systematic exit from lower-quality
collateral.
Beginning in early 2009, all of the liquidity facilities were wound down, and
the proceeds rolled into the outright purchase of MBS. This is the culmination of the
Fed's transformation into dealer of last resort. The fundamental problem was the
inability of the market to exit from its long MBS position. The Fed, ﬁnally, absorbed
this one-sided order ﬂow onto its balance sheet. There are some ﬁne points to note
in this process. The Fed purchased newly-issued mortgage-backed securities, not pre-
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existing ones. The eﬀect is the same, howeverknowing that the Fed stood ready to
buy, Fannie and Freddie stood willing to purchase and package mortgages. Knowing
this, mortgage lenders oﬀered credit to homeowners, holding down mortgage rates
and encouraging households to reﬁnance. Households used these funds to pay oﬀ
their existing mortgages, helping along the winding down of previously issued MBS.
Figure 2.12 illustrates this process, focusing on the net balance-sheet changes.
We consolidate the ﬁnancial system into three balance sheetswealth holders, who
started out holding MBS and were trying to liquidate them; the Fed; and the banking
system, which was unwilling to take MBS on to its balance sheet but was happy to
hold more reserves at the Fed. These balance sheets do not correspond directly to
those of individual players in the ﬁnancial markets; some holders of MBS were banks
or bank subsidiaries. Rather, they show the underlying ﬁnancial logic of the Fed's
actions. The balance sheets parallel those of Figure 2.8, with reserves replacing repo,











Figure 2.12: Schematic balance sheets, dealer of last resort ﬁnancing. The Fed ab-
sorbed a one-sided order ﬂow out of MBS, ﬁnancing its position with new reserves.
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Finally, Figure 2.8 also points back to the liquidity facilities of the second stage
of the crisis (TAF, TSLF, and PDCF). These we have classiﬁed as public lender-
of-last-resort operations, but even these were targeted at the dealer system. TAF
aimed to support bank reﬁnancing of dealer positions by making reserves easier to
obtain, while PDCF and TSLF aimed to make reﬁnance of MBS positions possible
by allowing holders of MBS to swap them for better collateral. In a less severe crisis,
these interventions might have been enough. In the event, they were not. The dealer
function did not just need support; it stopped completely and needed replacement.
2.5 International considerations
The crisis was centered in US dollar funding markets. Disruptions mainly
spread to other countries via investments in these dollar markets. In this section, we
look at how this happened, and how last-resort operations were carried out interna-
tionally.
The crisis was a shortage of dollar funding, but what if you didn't have dollars,
or in other words access to Fed Funds? Then you are left with the Eurodollar market,
paying term dollar LIBOR if you can get it, or borrowing in some other currency and
swapping into dollars if you can't. The return to such an approach is the LIBOR
OIS spread, shown in Figure 2.13. If we think of OIS as the market's expectation of
future short rates, we can interpret the spread of LIBOR over OIS as a reﬂection of
the pressure for term ﬁnancing. What the ﬁgure shows is the ex ante proﬁt incentive
for anyone with access to Fed Funds to supply term ﬁnancing to anyone without such
access, ex ante because you can lock in the cost of funds with the OIS swap. 100
basis points did the trick in stage 1, but not in stage 3.
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Figure 2.13: USD LIBOROIS spread, 1 and 3 months.
2.5.1 European banks
The epicenter of the crisis was in USD mortgage lending, but this did not
conﬁne it to US ﬁnancial institutions. In the decade leading up to 2007, European
banks' US dollar assets had grown signiﬁcantly. Between 2000 and 2007, for example,
they grew from under $3 trillion to over $8 trillion (Baba and Packer, 2009; Baba
et al., 2009). These assets were one side of a maturity transformation, funded as they
were by short-term US dollar liabilities. McGuire and von Peter (2009) measure this
transformation by computing a dollar funding gapthe amount of long-maturity US
dollar assets supported by short-maturity US dollar liabilitieswhich they calculate
to be $1.1$1.3 trillion at its peak in early 2007. European banks had also extended
guaranteed US dollar credit lines in support of conduits in the US (Baba et al., 2008),
apparently under the assumption that Eurodollar funds would be available to fund
these extensions of credit if necessary.7
7See Pozsar et al. (2010) for more on the activities of European SIVs.
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As the crisis deepened and the money markets dried up, European SIVs expe-
rienced funding problems similar to their US counterparts. However, as their assets
were mainly dollar-denominated and greatly exceeded the dollar deposits held by their
parent banks, the gap had to be funded in euros, which entailed exchange risk. While
European banks had access to the ECB for funding as a backstop, this was funding in
euros, not dollars. Consequently, establishing a euro-based lender of last resort was
only a solution insofar as these euros could be swapped into dollars. European banks
were exposed to a reduction in the availability of short-term dollar funding.
Early in the crisis, private lender-of-last-resort facilities were available to Euro-
pean banks. An important channel for reﬁnance was through money market mutual
funds (MMMFs). European banks held about $8 trillion in USD assets. MMMFs pro-
vided, by mid-2008, about $1.2 trillion in USD ﬁnancing (Baba et al. (2009). MMMFs
appear to have increased their lending to non-US banks between August 2007 and
August 2008. Assets at MMMFs were increasing as investors withdrew funds from
the ABCP market and elsewhere. In turn, MMMFs were drawing down their holdings
in the CP market and shifting to CDs, including Eurodollar CDs. (Baba et al. (2009)
conclude that, since European banks' share of issuance of the latter is greater than
that of the former, this represents an increase in MMMF funding of European banks.
This avenue of funding seems to have expanded until the collapse of Lehman, when














Figure 2.14: Schematic balance sheets, private lender of last resort ﬁnancing, Eu-
ropean banks. Initial holders of ABCP were unwilling to roll over their positions,
but they deposited funds in money market mutual funds, which provided Eurodollar
lending to European banks in support of their SIVs.
Later, the Fed's liquidity facilities were able to channel funds to European
banks, which had limited access to dollar funding markets through the parent com-
pany. Their US oﬃces, however, have access to the Fed's facilities for depository
institutions. Moreover, some banks are also primary dealers, and would have gained
additional access to facilities as such (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). European
banks' net local claims in the US fell by some $300 billion through mid-2008, as local
liabilities increased and local assets remained stable, driven by increased use of the
Fed's liquidity facilities. At the same time, net claims of European banks' US oﬃces
on their own related foreign oﬃces, presumably their European home oﬃces, rose by
a similar amount (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). Such reﬁnancing is shown in T


















Figure 2.15: Schematic balance sheets, public lender of last resort ﬁnancing, European
banks via their US branches. The Fed's liquidity facilities supported European banks'
reﬁnancing of their dollar SIVs via the banks' U.S. branches.
2.5.2 The Federal Reserve's response to international funding
pressures
Generally, European ﬁnancial institutions face two options when trying to ob-
tain dollar funding.8 They can borrow directly in the dollar cash market, or they can
borrow in euros and then swap these into dollars. A Euro/US dollar foreign-exchange
swap is a ﬁxed-term contract in which one exchanges euros for dollars at the current
spot rate with the agreement to convert the dollars back into euros at a later date; the
8The following argument holds true for an non-US ﬁnancial institution, but here we use Europe
as an example.
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tenor and future exchange rate given by the corresponding forward rate. Normally,
the absence of arbitrage tends to equalize the return to these options: the total cost of
borrowing in the euro LIBOR market and converting them to dollars through the FX
swap market should be equivalent to borrowing dollars directly in the dollar LIBOR






= 1 + rUSDt,t+s , (2.2)
where Ft,t+s denotes the forward rate for s periods ahead, St is the current spot rate,
rEURt,t+s is euro LIBOR from time t to t+s and r
USD
t,t+s is the equivalent US dollar LIBOR.
This formula is the covered interest parity condition of international ﬁnance.
The Eurodollar markets were increasingly frozen as the crisis progressed, mak-
ing it diﬃcult for European institutions to borrow dollars directly (i.e. the right
hand side of equation (2.2) gradually became in a sense irrelevant). The reduction
in the availability of short-term dollar funding intensiﬁed throughout 2007. Banks
responded by drawing on several sources of funds. McGuire and von Peter (2009)
estimate that, by mid-2007, European banks held USD interbank (i.e., Eurodollar)
borrowing of $400 billion and borrowing from central banks of $380 billion. They
also had drawn on euro-denominated local sources of short-term funding (deposits)
and swapped $800 billion of euros into dollars. As signiﬁcant lending retrenchment
continued on both sides of the Atlantic by the end of 2007, demand for short-term
funds was high and US banks became unwilling to extend funds to their European
counterparts ((alias?)). As the ABCP market dried up, US conduits called in their
credit lines, putting pressure on European banks just as their shortage of funds be-
came severe. Indeed, unused credit commitments of European banks fell by $233
billion from mid-2007 to the Lehman collapse, suggesting that these credit lines were
being drawn upon (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). The Eurodollar market, which
had served as a lender of last resort for European banks' US dollar operations, broke
down.
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Consequently, European banks increasingly turned to obtaining funding in eu-
ros (which they could do through ECB backstops) and swapping them into dollars.
Yet an FX swap is not a fully collateralized transaction and involves exposure to
both counterparty and liquidity risk. As documented by Baba and Packer (2009),
the large demand for dollars resulted in a highly one-sided order ﬂow that impeded
liquidity in the FX swap market. At the same time, the perception of counterparty
risk was increasing, and US banks saw their European counterparts in these swap
transactions as increasingly risky. This increased the cost of obtaining dollar fund-
ing through swaps by widening spreads, and further reduced liquidity as US banks
became reluctant to extend credit to their European counterparties. The result was
a dislocation in the CIP relationship (2.2) as the FX swap implied dollar funding
rate greatly exceeded the US dollar LIBOR funding rate. Swap counterparties were
demanding increasing compensation to accept the risk, and the one-sided order ﬂow
(from euros into dollars) prevented the CIP arbitrage from working. European SIVs
found it increasingly diﬃcult to obtain dollar funding and consequently to remain
solvent. The gradual increase of the euro swap implied rate from the US LIBOR rate
and the resulting size of the deviation from CIP is displayed in Figure 2.16.
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Figure 2.16: The dislocation between the 3-month euro swap implied borrowing rate
(the rate at which one can borrow dollars by swapping euros) and 3-month dollar
LIBOR. The black area shows that as the crisis progressed the swap implied rate
exceeded LIBOR: this is the size of the deviation from covered interest parity. The
ﬁgure follows Baba and Packer (2009).
In response to this US dollar shortage, the Federal Reserve announced the
establishment of foreign-exchange swap lines with the ECB on December 12, 2007.9
In this program, the Fed provided US dollars to the ECB in the form of foreign
exchange swaps, providing the ECB with dollar reserves. The ECB then lent out
these dollar funds through a program similar to the Fed's Term Auction Facility.
Use of the swap lines was approximately $50 billion through the ﬁrst two stages of
the crisis, and rose to over $200 billion after Lehman's collapse. In this way the
9Swap lines were established with the Swiss National Bank on this date as well. Later in the
crisis, these were extended to many other non-US central banks as well.
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euro-denominated backstop of the ECB was transformed into a dollar-denominated
backstop so that European SIVs could continue to fund their US dollar assets.
2.5.3 The European Central Bank as public lender of last re-
sort
Apart from the coordination of US dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve,
the ECB also provided other backstops throughout the ﬁnancial turmoil. The ECB
began to provide longer-term liquidity to European banks very early on in. Gonzalez-
Paramo (2009) notes that in 2007, reﬁnancing operations at 3 months were initiated
(as opposed to the pre-crisis norm of 1-week operations), and their use had increased.
6- and 12-month liquidity was also eventually extended. This shift is evident in the
Eurosystem balance sheet, Figure 2.18. Around August 2007, a switch from main
reﬁnancing operations to longer reﬁnancing operations is evident (see Figure 2.17).
No dramatic shift in the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet occurred, which is
comparable to the Fed's balance sheet for this period, though the Eurosystem balance
sheet did continue a secular expansion.
An important diﬀerence between ECB and Federal Reserve ﬁnancing opera-
tions during this period is in the list of eligible collateral. Even before the crisis,
the ECB had accepted a much wider array of collateral for reﬁnancing operations
than had the Fed. Moreover, the stigma associated with the use of the Fed's dis-
count window was not a factor in Europe, and there was, eﬀectively, greater access
to central-bank reﬁnancing as a result (Hördahl and King, 2008; González-Páramo,
2009). This in turn helped the euro repo market avoid the disruptions faced by the
dollar repo markethigher-quality collateral could be preserved for private transac-
tions, while lower-quality collateral could be pledged to the ECB for central-bank
reﬁnancing. GC pooling arrangements also appear to have been beneﬁcial (Hordahl
and King (2008)). Consequently, euro repo spreads never widened to the degree that
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Figure 2.17: Schematic balance sheets, public lender of last resort ﬁnancing, Euro-
pean banks. As SIVs backed by European banks drew on credit lines, the need for
term ﬁnancing increased. The ECB initially met this need by increasing long-term
reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) at the expense of main (short-term) reﬁnancing op-
erations (MROs).
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Figure 2.18: Eurosystem assets, 20072010. The largely secular increase in the overall
size of the balance sheet through the ﬁrst two stages of the crisis is evident, with
the exception of year-end 2007. The shift from short- to long-term reﬁnancing is
evident as early as August 2007. The bright orange region (third from the top) is
reclassiﬁed into a peach-colored region in July of 2009, which is simultaneous with
the implementation of a program to purchase covered bonds as a means to reﬁnance
banks (González-Páramo, 2009). The dollar swap lines, shown in green, increased




As the microstructure of the ﬁnancial system changes, the system's capacity
to stabilize itself must change as well. Lender-of-last-resort operations are suited to
a bank-credit ﬁnancial system, in which banks fund loans with deposits. When a
solvent institution is faced with a liquidity crisis (that is, a bank run), the right thing
to do is to provide funds against good collateral (Bagehot, 1873). In a capital-markets
ﬁnancial system, dealers make markets in tradable securities that are normally liquid,
ﬁnancing their positions in the repo market. When holders of these securities want
to liquidate their positions, the consequences are magniﬁed because the securities
are serving as collateral for their own ﬁnancing. Liquidity vanishes quickly. The
global credit crisis that began in 2007, though aptly described as a run on the repo
market (Gorton and Metrick, 2009; Adrian et al., 2009), demands a diﬀerent kind of
policy responseit is the role of securities dealer that must be fulﬁlled by the public
sector. The private and public responses through September 2008 were insuﬃcient
to stabilize the system; it was only when the Fed ﬁnally became a dealer that some
semblance of order returned.
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Chapter 3
Hedging Imbalances and Uncovered
Interest Parity: The Evidence Implied
by the Currency Options Market1
3.1 Introduction
The Keynes-Hicks theory of normal backwardation for commodity futures rests
on the idea that, normally, commodity sellers have a greater need to hedge than
commodity buyers, so that the net hedging demand for futures is on the short side.
According to the theory, this imbalance in supply and demand tends to drive futures
prices below expected spot prices, and that diﬀerential oﬀers an expected proﬁt to
speculators who come in to meet the hedging demand. The theory thus suggests that
a long futures position tends on average to produce a proﬁt.
The contribution of Hicks was to generalize this theory by applying it to money.
Here the idea is that, normally, borrowers have a greater need to hedge than lenders,
and this tends to drive interest rate futures above the expected spot rate, so attracting
1This chapter is co-authored with Perry Mehrling.
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speculators who are willing to borrow short and lend long in order to harvest the
diﬀerential between long rates and short rates. Hicks' version of the theory is thus
intended to explain the failure of the Expectations Theory of the term structure of
interest rates. Long rates are higher than short rates not because short rates are
expected to rise in the future but rather because borrowers are willing to pay a
premium to lock in future borrowing rates.
Our idea is to apply the Keynes-Hicks mode of reasoning to explain the failure
of another venerable theory, the Uncovered Interest Parity theory of exchange rates.
UIP says that the forward exchange rate is an unbiased forecast of the future spot
exchange rate. Put more simply, if the interest rate in dollars is higher than the
interest rate in yen, then UIP says that the yen can be expected to appreciate against
the dollar by exactly the amount of the interest rate diﬀerential.
Empirically however the typical ﬁnding is that not only does the yen not ap-
preciate suﬃciently, in fact it tends to depreciate. High interest rate currencies tend
to appreciate against low interest rate currencies. This typical failure of UIP is the
source of the proﬁt of what is known as the "carry trade", which in its economic
essentials involves borrowing in the low interest currency and lending in the high in-
terest currency, harvesting the interest diﬀerential as proﬁt, plus also a further proﬁt
should the funding currency depreciate. Why is the carry trade typically proﬁtable?
The Keynes-Hicks approach to answering such a question would view the proﬁt
as necessary to induce speculators to ﬁll in for an imbalance in hedging demand. If
the hedging demand for the high interest currency is net short, then speculators must
be induced by prospective proﬁt to take net long positions. Thus, if the interest rate
in dollars is higher than the interest rate in yen, we might imagine a trade between
hedgers and speculators taking place in the international market for bank deposits as
follows:
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Hedgers (Economic System) Speculators (Financial System)
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Yen LIBOR Dollar LIBOR Dollar LIBOR Yen LIBOR
Table 3.1: Illustration of hypothetical asset holdings of hedgers and speculators. The
hedgers have a long position in Yen LIBOR and an oﬀsetting short position in Dollar
LIBOR. The speculators take the opposite position, having a long position in Dollar
LIBOR and a short position in Yen LIBOR. In this example, we assume that Dollar
LIBOR > Yen LIBOR
At the inception of the trade, hedgers borrow 100 dollars at the high dollar
LIBOR rate, and lend 100/S yen at the low yen LIBOR rate. At the end of the trade,
hedgers convert their yen accounts to dollars at the prevailing spot rate and use the
proceeds to repay their dollar borrowing. If that ﬁnal spot rate is equal to the forward
rate implied by the interest rate diﬀerential (F=S(1+r$)/(1+rY) where F and S are
expressed as $/Y), then the proceeds will exactly cover the debtthis is UIP. But if
the ﬁnal spot rate is lower then yen proceeds will be less than what is needed. The
hedgers will lose and what they lose the speculators will gain.
Is this theory plausible? One way to answer the question is to ask whether
there is any reason to expect a net short hedging demand for the high interest rate
currency. This is an interesting question.2 But for our purposes we are less interested
in tracking down the theoretical origin of the imbalance, and more interested in
tracking down the empirical consequences. In particular, if this theory of the failure
of UIP is correct, then a measure of the degree of hedging imbalance today should
2For example, the current dollar funding overhang has been a source of violations of covered
interest parity, following Baba et al (BIS 2008), and so a fortiori also a source of violation of UIP.
European banks have dollar denominated mortgage backed securities as assets, but euro-denominated
deposits as liabilities. They thus have a natural short hedging demand for dollars, which speculators
must be persuaded (by expected prot) to meet. More recently, the Fed swap facility has met that
demand, so stabilizing markets. This latter example is a case of government interference, which we
explore in future research.
148
help us to forecast the spot exchange rate in the future by helping us to correct for
the bias in the forward exchange rate. If we ﬁnd such a measure, that in itself will
tend to support the plausibility of the theory.
Our approach to measuring the imbalance will focus not on quantities but
rather on prices, and in particular on the price of currency options, which are traded
on the over the counter market (OTC). The basic idea is that, when an imbalance in
hedging demand pushes forward prices away from expected spot prices, it also pushes
option prices (and implied volatilities) away from their no-arbitrage valuations.
Concretely, imagine that the demand for forward hedges has become so large
that speculators are becoming wary of the large long dollar forward positions they
are carrying on their books. They could of course respond by demanding a higher
risk premium, but there is another margin along which they can adjust as well. The
big risk in holding a carry trade is that the investment currency (dollar) depreciates
against the funding currency (yen) by more than the interest diﬀerential. You can
hedge that risk, and so carry a larger position, by buying a put option on the invest-
ment currency with a strike price at the current forward rate F. For the cost of the
option premium, you can ensure that your carry trade will at worst net zero proﬁt.
Of course this trade merely transfers the risk of the carry trade (and also a
good bit of the expected return) to the seller of the option, so it might appear that
it does nothing to satisfy the excess demand for hedges. But if the seller of the
put is a dealer (as is most common in this OTC market), that dealer will hedge
the risk exposure with a dynamic delta hedge in the forward exchange market. For
example, an at-the-money put struck at the current forward rate will have a delta
of 0.5, so a hedge would involve purchasing long dollar forward positions equal to
half the notional option exposure. The point is that the use of the options market
transforms a $100 long forward exposure on the speculator's balance sheet into a $50
long forward exposure on the dealer's balance sheet, essentially leveraging a dynamic
hedge in order to meet hedging demand.
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Now a dynamic hedge is not the same thing as a true hedge, and dealers
presumably know this and include a premium for bearing this residual risk when they
quote prices for options. Thus, we can expect the price of currency options to reﬂect
the degree of imbalance in the demand for hedges. If the underlying true currency
volatility were constant, we could simply use the ﬂuctuating implied volatility as a
measure of imbalance, and we might expect that when we include this measure in a
standard UIP regression it will help to forecast spot rates, and move the parameter
estimates on the other regressors closer to the UIP null. This idea constitutes the
ﬁrst component of our empirical section below.
Of course true currency volatility is not a constant. But we might still imple-
ment the basic idea by forming estimates of the true volatility and comparing with
implied volatility. We do this by forecasting future volatility over the life of the option
and separating it out from the implied volatility. We then add this measure to the
UIP regression. Once we do this, we ﬁnd that this measure of imbalance does in fact
help to forecast exchange rates and in some cases will slightly move the parameters
closer to the UIP null, although coeﬃcients remain quite negative in most cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
basic theory behind Uncovered Interest Parity and derives the Fama (1984) regression
which we subsequently use and augment in order to test UIP. Section 3 explains
the properties of the currency options market that are important to our empirical
implementation. Section 4 constitutes the empirical component of the paper. Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Uncovered Interest Parity and Its Failure
Let Stdenote the spot exchange rate, Ft denote the forward exchange rate for a
forward contract that matures at time t+1, rt denote the deomestic interest rate and
r∗t denote the foreign interest rate. Uncovered interest parity is in eﬀect a statement
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about the zero net investment strategy of borrowing in the currency with the lower
interest rate and using this money to invest in the currency with the higher interest
rate. If we normalize the amount borrowed to one dollar and rt < r
∗
t , the stratey is
broken down into the following steps:
• Borrow one dollars at the domestic interest rate rt
• Convert the dollars into the foreign currency at the spot rate, which gives 1
St
units of foreign currency
• Invest this amount 1
St
at the foreign interest rate r∗
• At time t + 1 convert the amount 1
St








(1 + r∗)− (1 + rt) (3.1)
Since this is a zero net investment strategy, it must be true that
Et(Mt+1zt+1) = 0 (3.2)
where Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor that prices dollar denominated payoﬀs.
By covered interest parity, it must also be true that
(1 + rt) =
1
St
(1 + r∗t )Ft (3.3)




Mt+1) = 0 (3.4)
This is another way of showing that the trading strategy outlined above which borrows
in one currency to invest in another has equivalent returns to buying the currencies
against each other in the forward market, due to the covered interest parity condition.
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Since leverage is more easily obtained by conducting investments in the forward rather
than the spot market, this tends to be a more common strategy (Burnside et al. ,
Gagnon and Chaboud (2007)). We can also see this from the fact that the volume in
the forward market is much larger than the spot market.
It is common to express above variables in logarithmic form in order to test UIP.







that ln(St+1) and ln(Mt+1) are joint conditionally lognormally distributed
3 (see for
example Bekaert and Hodrick (1993)). Letting lowercase letters denote logarithms,
we can rewrite (3.4) as
Et (st+1 − st) = ft − st − Covt(st+1,mt+1)− 0.5V art(st+1)
The last term 0.5V art(st+1) is referred to as a 'Jensen's inequality term' and is gener-
ally disregarded when testing UIP. Authors have shown that it is very small, and does
not tend to have an eﬀect on UIP tests (Engel (1996)). The term Covt(st+1,mt+1) is
the risk premium. Since UIP assumes risk neutrality, the risk-premium is assumed to
be zero. A prediction of UIP then is that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor
of the future spot rate:
Et(st+1) = ft (3.5)
As a consequence, then change in spot exchange rate over the period should be equal
to the interest diﬀerential: Et(st+1 − st) = it − i∗t . The intuition is that the interest
rate between two countries is merely compensation for an expected change in the
exchange rate over the period. One should not be able to accrue proﬁts simply by
borrowing in currencies with low interest rates and using the proceeds to invest in
currencies with high interest rates.








2V art(mt+1) + 2Cov(mt+1, st+1))
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To test UIP empirically, the conditional expectation is generally dealt with by
assuming rational expectations, in which case
st+1 = Et(st+1) + t+1
that is, the realized percentage change in the spot rate is equal to the expected change
plus a forecast error that is orthogonal to any information known about the spot rate
at time t. If
1. rational expectations hold
2. the risk-premium is zero (agents are risk-neutral), and
3. covered interest parity holds
then we can test Uncovered Interest Parity by running the Fama (1984) regression
st+1 − st = α + β (ft − st) + t+1 (3.6)
where under the null hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of
the future spot rate, α = 0, β = 1 and t+1 is orthogonal to time t information.
In reality, estimates of β are usually negative which implies that high interest rate
currencies tend to appreciate rather than depreciate. This is commonly referred to
as the forward premium puzzle. Uncovered interest parity does not tend to hold.
A large and ever-growing literature exists which attempts to explain the ob-
served deviations from UIP. Surveys can be found in Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler
(1990) and Engel (1996). Common lines of investigation as to why UIP fails include
risk-based explanations, econometric issues in the Fama regression, and expectational
errors. So far none of these have managed to solve the puzzle. After thirty years of
research, signiﬁcant deviations from UIP continue to exist and the forward premium
puzzle still stands. An oﬀshoot of the failure to understand UIP's failure, as well as
other puzzles in international ﬁnance, has led to a slow trend in the literature to bet-
ter understand and account for the inner workings of foreign exchange markets and
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issues faced by practitioners. This trend has led to a branch of literature which at-
tempts to explain UIP failures based on the workings of the foreign exchange market
rather than relying on traditional risk-based eplanations.
3.3 The Currency Options Market
The forward looking information in currency options provide a useful source
of information to academics in understanding the workings of exchange rates. A sur-
prisingly small number of papers had looked into these markets until recently. Chen
(1997) provides a good compilation of earlier academic research relating currency
options to exchange rate economics. A recent spate of papers has begun to revisit
the currency option market as a source of information relevant to the forward pre-
mium puzzle. For example, Jurek (2008), Burnside et al. (2011), Brunnemeier et al.
(2008) and Farhi and Gabaix (2008) study the currency option market in relation to
measuring crash risk to the carry trade as a source of the forward premium puzzle.
Before turning to the data, we give here a brief overview of the relevant char-
acteristics of the currency options market.4 Although the currency options market is
small relative to the overall market for foreign exchange, it is quite deep and liquid in
absolute terms, and has been growing at a faster rate than the overall fx market. The
tables below, taken from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2007 triennial
suvery, display these facts. Foreign exchange daily market turnover has increased to
3.2 trillion USD per day, and increase of nearly 70% since 2004, while foreign ex-
change options increased by 81% to 212 billion USD per day. The data also show
that forwards and swaps tend to outweigh trading in the spot market, supporting
the idea that investors are more likely to exploit deviations from UIP in the forward
market than by physically borrowing low yielding currencies and converting them in
4The facts in this section pertaining to the mechanics of the currency options market are taken
from Malz (1997), DeRosa (2000), Taylor (2003), Weithers (2006) and Jurek (2008).
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the spot market.
Global Foreign Exchange Daily Market Turnover (Billions)
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Amount 820 1,190 1,490 1,200 1,900 3,210
Percent Change 45.12% 25.21% -19.46% 58.33% 68.95%
Table 3.2: Average daily market turnover in the foreign exchange market. Source:
Bank for International Settlements Triennial Survey (2007).
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Spot Foreign ExchangeTransactions 394 494 568 387 631 1,005
Foreign Exchange Derivatives 959 853 1,303 2,319
Outright Forwards and Foreign Exchange Swaps 862 786 1,163 2,076
Currency Swaps 10 7 21 32
Options 87 60 117 212
Percent Change -31.03% 95.00% 81.20%
Other 0 0 2 0
Table 3.3: Global Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives daily average market turnover,
in billions of USD. Source: Bank for International Settlements Triennial Survey
(2007).
Foreign exchange options are primarily traded over the counter (OTC) rather
than on a centralized exchange.5 While exchange traded options generally expire
on ﬁxed calendar days so that their prices on successive days pertain to options of
decreasing maturity, OTC traded currency options are quoted at constant maturities
so that a fresh option for a standard maturity can be purchased daily. Thus, it is
possible to obtain a daily time-series on one month options for example, in the same
way that one obtains a daily time series of one month forward rates. OTC options
5The Philadelphia Stock Exchange does have exchange traded currency options, while the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange has options on currency futures. These are both dwarfed by the over the counter
market.
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are European, which also makes inference easier; exchange traded currency options
tend to be American.
The prices of currency options are quoted in terms of their Garman-Kolhagen
(1983) implied volatilities rather than in currency terms, and their moneyness is
quoted in terms of delta rather than amount. To specify, let the price of a call option
be denoted as Ct, and the price of a put as Pt. The Garman-Kohagen formula for the

















d2 = d1 − σt(K, τ)
√
τ
is the time to expiration of the option, Ft, is the forward rate quoted at time t over
the period in units of domestic currency, K is the strike exchange rate of the option,
id,t is the domestic risk-free interest rate quoted at time t over the life of the option
and t(K, ) is the implied volatility. In the market, the price of an option is given
by quoting the implied volatiltiy t. This value is then substituited into the above
formula to arrive at the monetary price. In the context of the model, the implied
volatility parameter t(K, )can be interpreted as the risk-neutral standard deviation
of the exchange rate's ﬂuctuations over the life of the option. In quoting option
prices however the Garman-Kohagen implied volatility is completely divorced from
the model and is used simply as a way of expressing price. The moneyness of an
option is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the spot exchange rate and the option's
exercise price (the strike exchange rate). However, dealers quote the moneyness of
an option in terms of its delta, the rate of change of the option value with respect to
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δp = −e−i∗t τN(−d1) (3.7)
where the delta of a put is related to the delta of a call by the formula δp = δc − 1.
Given a quoted value for delta, one can use these formulas to solve for the implied
strike price, K.
Delta is expressed as a percentage and is thus bounded between zero and one.
The more in the money an option goes, the closer to 1 its delta will be, and the more
out of the money it goes the closer to zero it will be. An at the money option with a
strike price equal to the forward rate has a delta of approximately 0.5. Deltas of in
the money options will increase as expiry approaches and their exercise becomes more
certain, while deltas of out of the money options will decrease as expiry approaches
and the option looks like it will be abandoned. A very rough rule of thumb among
some traders is to think of the delta as the probability of the option expiring in the
money. In this sense, an at the money option with a delta of 0.5 can be thought of as
a "coin toss" as to whether the option will be exercised at expiration. Since p = c−1,
the delta of a put option will be negative. The convention is to express the delta of
an option as a percentage rather than a decimal and omit the negative sign for a put
option. For example, a '25 delta put' refers to a put option with a delta of -0.25.
Of course, delta also refers to the `delta hedging' technique whereby dealers
hedge their positions by adjusting their holdings incrementally. In practice, dealers
do not hedge each option individually, but rather hedge their entire portfolio of puts
and calls as if they constitute one large option. The net delta of the portfolio is just
the sum of the deltas on the individual options. Thus, one can sum all the deltas of
6Note that by the continuous time version of covered interest parity, Ft, = St,e
(i−i∗), so that the
spot rate shows up in the option pricing formulas.
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the portfolios in order to come up with the overall hedging requirement. This may
be a reason for quoting moneyness by delta rather than exchange rate.
When dealers buy options from other dealers, they will generally sell the for-
ward foreign exchange (the delta hedge) to the writer at the same time. This is called
"crossing the delta" and ensures that the dealers are in agreement on the current
forward rate. It also reﬂects the fact that dealers are not in the business of taking ex-
change rate positions (directional positions) but rather volatility positions. This is an
important idea to keep in mind for the purpose of our motivation. Currency options
dealers are not trying to bet on direction, but rather to hedge positions. They will
lose out not if the currency goes the 'wrong way', but if the actual volatility ends up
being higher than the implied volatility. Also, any excessive overhang in the market
or hedging imbalances which would result in a higher option price being quoted re-
sults in a higher implied volatility. Since a higher implied volatility in our framework
then can mean either a higher expectation of future volatility or an overhang in the
market, we would like to be able to separate these out.
We collect data on delta neutral straddles, whose implied volatility is used in
the market to describe the 'at the money' volatility and are the most liquid. A straddle
consists of purchasing an at the money call while selling an at the money put, and as
such is considered a pure bet on volatility. The implied volatiltiy of a delta neutral
straddle in the fx market is generally referred to as the 'at the money' volatility.
Although their implied volatilities are sometimes (somewhat erroneously) referred to
as 'at the money forward volatilities', corresponding to the fact that an option with
its strike price equal to the forward rate will have a delta equal to approximately 0.5,
in reality the strike price will be slightly diﬀerent than the forward rate. As Jurek
(2008) points out, the exact strike price for a delta neutral straddle is found by setting
c(K) + p(K) = 0 in (3.7) above and solving for K. The result is that both the call
and the put in the portfolio must have a delta of 0.5, and the exact expression for the
straddle's strike price (the 'at-the-money' strike), KATM and its implied volatility,
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3.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Exchange rate data is downloaded from Datastream, consisting of spot rates
and one month forward rates for the British Pound, Japanese Yen, Norwegian Krone,
Swedish Krona, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, and New Zealand Dollar against
the US dollar. The currency options refer to an underlying spot rate that follows
the industry convention as to which currency (home or domestic) is quoted as the
numeraire currency, and as such the numeraire currency changes depending on the
exchange rate that is quoted. The industry convention is to write each currency pair
in the style XXX/YYY where Y is the numeraire currency. For example, the euro
versus the US dollar would be written EUR/USD and quoted in terms of US dollars
per euro, while the dollar versus the Japanese yen would be written USD/JPY and
quoted in terms of yen per US dollars. In order to be consistent with the options data,
we keep all spot rates in terms of their industry conventions. Table 3.4 summarizes
the style of quote for each currency.
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Symbol Deﬁnition Numeraire or Implication of a fall
'Domestic' Currency in the exchange rate
USD/JPY Japanese yen per USD Japanese yen JPY appreciation
USD/CHF Swiss francs per USD Swiss franc CHF appreciation
USD/CAD Canadian dollars per USD Canadian dollar CAD appreciation
AUD/USD US Dollars per Australian dollar US dollar USD appreciation
NZD/USD US Dollars per New Zealand dollars US dollar USD appreciation
USD/SEK Swedish kronas per USD Swedish krona SEK appreciation
USD/NOK Norwegian krones per USD Norwegian krone NOK appreciation
Table 3.4: Industry quotation conventions for the currency spot rates considered, in
order to clarify which is the numeraire currency in each case. 'Implication of a fall
in the exchange rate' means that for example, a fall in the GBP/USD quote implies
dollar appreciation, while a fall in the USD/JPY quote implies dollar depreciation.
We obtain over the counter options data from a large foreign exchange op-
tions market maker consisting of implied volatilty quotes on one month delta-neutral
straddles for the same currency pairs, from March 1999 to November 2008. For the
yen, pound and franc we are able to obtain a longer sample which begins in May
1991. Descriptive statistics for the change in the log spot rate, st+1 − st, the log of
the forward premium ft−st and the option implied volatilities are given in Table 3.5.
3.4.2 UIP Regressions
We begin by reconﬁrming the failure of UIP by using our data to run the
standard Fama (1984) regression
st+1 − st = α + β(ft − st) + t+1
Before proceeding with our results, we note that there was an unprecedented
move in the exchange rates from July to October 2008 (the last three months of our
sample), due to the ﬁnancial crisis. The extent of the move in the exchange rates































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the spot rate prior to and post June 2008, where here all currencies are in dollars
per unit of foreign currency. As we can see, there was a massive strengthening in the
dollar against all currencies in our sample with the exception of the yen, and of the
yen against the euro. Since the log diﬀerences are approximately equal to percent
changes, it is stunning to see the dollar display an average move of over 15% per
month in many cases over this period, when the average move since 1999 had been
less than 0.5% per month.






New Zealand 0.0037 -0.1421
Table 3.6: Average monthly changes in the log spot exchange rate st+1 − st before
versus during the ﬁnancial crisis
The magnitude of this move in st+1 − st, the right hand side variable in the
UIP regression, will aﬀect our results. On the one hand we do not wish to simply
throw away the information coming from the latter part of the sample. First, it may
be instructive to investigate the behavior of UIP and implied volatilities over this
time of crisis - in some ways this may be the most interesting part. Second, as our
sample is already limited in size, we do not wish to throw away data that we have.
Therefore, in order to deal with this issue we report all results over two samples: one
for the full period March 1999 - October 2008, and another for the shorter period
March 1999 - June 2008.
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The results of the UIP regression over our sample period are reported below.
The currencies are ordered in terms of their liquidity (measured by total traded vol-
ume) according to the BIS 2007 survey. Looking ﬁrst at the regressions over the
'non-crisis' period of March 1999 - June 20087 , we reconﬁrm the results that have
been reported many times in the literature. The beta tends to be negative, often
signiﬁcantly so and often a number greater than three. The R-squares tend to be
quite low, and the standard errors are large. Extending the sample to include July -
October 2008, we see that for many currencies the beta tends to remain negative but
increase. This is likely due to the fact that the dollar had an interest rate that was
lower than most currencies (with the exception of the yen) over the period while tend-
ing to appreciate strongly. Particularly notable are the Australian and New Zealand
dollars, for which the sign turns positive. These currencies were the main vehicles
for exploiting UIP deviations through carry trades among the major currencies. As
the dollar strengthened and investors rushed to unwind these trades, the AUD and
NZD saw particularly large moves compared to others, as shown by Table 3.6 above.
Including the Fall of 2008 in the sample leads to a fall in the R and an increase in
standard errors.8
Table 3.8 gives the results of the UIP regression over the longer period of May
1991 - October 2008. Again we see results similar to those reported in the literature
for Japan and Switzerland: the betas are negative and the R2 is low. The positive
value of beta for the U.K. can be attributed to the British currency crisis of 1992,
7Note that the term 'non-crisis' here is of course misleading as the ﬁnancial crisis really began
around January 2007, and that carry trades unwound fairly severely in August 2007. This likely
contributes to the betas of many variables in our regressions that stop in June 2008 being insigniﬁcant
despite being negative.
8The large diﬀerences in some cases between the two periods is also a reminder of the issue of
small sample size when dealing with UIP regressions. Although the sample size is important to keep
in mind, previous have explored the issue of whether UIP's failure can be attributed to econometric
issues arising from small samples. While some ﬁnd a partial improvement in UIP regressions when
correcting for sample size (Bekaert and Hodrick (2001)), others ﬁnd that correcting for small samples
only tends to exacerbate the forward premium puzzle, i.e., to make the beta coeﬃcients more negative
(Villanueva, 2006).
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March 1999 - Oct 2008 March 1999 - June 2008
α β R2 α β R2
Japan -0.00390 -0.51610 0.00080 -0.00360 -0.95060 0.00300
(0.006) (1.8741) (0.0057) (1.6995)
Norway -0.00090 -0.05970 0.00000 -0.00320 -1.59040 0.01200
(0.0033) (1.6468) (0.003) (1.3564)
Switzerland -0.00820 -3.24330 0.01810 -0.0108* -3.82510 0.02730
(0.005) (2.1193) (0.0047) (2.0296)
U.K. -0.00420 -4.11430 0.02660 0.00140 -1.32650 0.00450
(0.0059) (4.3849) (0.0029) (2.0315)
Euro 0.00280 -4.08840 0.03340 0.0057* -4.4997* 0.05210
(0.003) (2.5349) (0.0025) (1.7739)
Australia 0.00030 0.89110 0.00080 0.00040 -2.34820 0.01150
(0.0058) (3.3442) (0.0048) (2.1027)
New Zealand -0.00010 0.02180 0.00000 -0.00330 -2.94770 0.01850
(0.0065) (2.517) (0.0063) (2.0448)
Table 3.7: UIP regression results of the log change in the one month spot rate on the
log of the forward premium: st+1 − st = α + β(ft − st) + t+1. * denotes signiﬁcance
at the 5% level. White standard errors in parentheses.
which is included in this sample, rather than the success of UIP.
3.4.3 The Impact of Implied Volatility on UIP Regressions
According to the theory described above, when the overhang in the currency
market becomes large, the speculators who take on the overhang may choose to hedge
their exposure in the currency option market. This transfers the risk (and a portion
of the return) to the options dealer. While the dealer attempts to dissipate this risk
by hedging dynamically, there will still be residual risk left over as dynamic hedges
are not perfect. As a consequence, the dealer will charge an extra premium for
bearing residual risk. Since we have seen that the price of an option is quoted by its
implied volatility, an increase in the implied volatility may give a rough indication of
this overhang. Accordingly, the implied volatility should inﬂuence future spot rates.
Adding implied volatility to the UIP regressions may also move the parameters closer
to the UIP null. In order to test this hypothesis, we add the implied volatility to the
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α β R2
Japan -0.00530 -1.37410 0.00700
(0.003) (1.0905)
U.K. 0.00060 1.30710 0.01730
(0.0023) (0.8155)
Switzerland -0.00190 -1.24350 0.00640
(0.0031) (1.2616)
Table 3.8: UIP regression results of the log change in the one month spot rate on the
log of the forward premium: st+1−st = α+β(ft−st)+ t+1, taken over a longer sample
(May 1991- October 2008). * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. White standard
errors in parentheses.
UIP regression as follows:
st+1 − st = α + β(ft − st) + γIVt + et (3.8)
The results are given below. Here the adjusted R-squared is reported to take
the extra variable into account.
Over the sample, the beta coeﬃcient tends to decrease on the yen, pound and
euro in the pre-crisis period. The coeﬃcient actually tends to get more negative for
the remaining currency pairs when implied volatilities are added to the regression.
The ﬁt tends to improve relative to the standard relative UIP regression for most
currencies; it appears that the implied volatilities have predictive power.
Similar results can be seen over the longer sample period for Japan, the U.K.
and Switzerland. Here the beta coeﬃcient becomes more negative in every case, and
the ﬁt improves for the U.K. and Switzerland. It would appear that on average, adding
implied volatilities by themselves to the UIP regression does not tend to improve the
forward premium puzzle.
3.4.4 Implied vs. Forecast Volatility and UIP
Given our framework, the implied volatility of foreign exchange options should







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































α β γ R2 − adj.
Japan -0.00460 -1.77450 -0.01840 0.00070
(0.0125) (1.0386) (0.1212)
U.K. -0.0438* 0.19130 0.4121* 0.06240
(0.0163) (1.0093) (0.1584)
Switzerland -0.0533* -5.149* 0.5056* 0.09560
(0.0125) (1.2581) (0.1292)
Table 3.10: Regressions of the log one month change in the spot exchange rate on the
log forward premium and the one month at the monty implied volatilities, taken over
a longer sample (May 1991 - October 2008): st+1 − st = α + β(ft − st) + γIVt+et. *
denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. White standard errors in prentheses.
market. As described above, the price of a currency option can reﬂect the degree of
imbalance in the demand for hedgers, where the price should increase when overhang
increases. This would lead the implied volatilities of these options to increase. The
second is due to the fact that volatility itself is changing: the expectation of higher
currency volatility in the future should increase the quoted implied volatility of foreign
exchange options. Ideally, we would like to separate out these two eﬀects. We do this
by obtaining a measure of forecast volatility over the same period as the option's
tenor and using this to look at the diﬀerence between implied volatility and realized
volatility.
The volatility of each currency pair is forecast using a GARCH(1,1) model. The
GARCH model is often the benchmark by which the forecasting ability of implied
volatility itself is judged in the volatility forecasting literature, and the GARCH
class are generally found to be the next best performer to implied volatility in terms
of volatility forecasting (see for example the survey by Poon (2005)). Although a
voluminous literature exists on more sophisticated classes of GARCH models, Hansen
and Lunde (2005) compare 14 such GARCH models to the basic GARCH(1,1) and
ﬁnd that for exchange rates none is statistically superior in terms of forecasting.
We download daily spot exchange rate quotes for each currency pair from
Datastream starting in June 1978. To obtain a time series of exchange rate volatility
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estimates that match the tenors of the options while only using information available
at the time of which the option quote is captured, we use a four year rolling window.
At each date for which an option is quoted, the parameters of the GARCH model are
re-estimated using the previous four years of daily data.9 These parameters are used
to construct the volatility forecast at time t over the life of the option. In a standard
GARCH(1,1) model, wherein the variance is estimated as





the n day ahead volatility forecast made on day t is given by
σ2t+n =
ω







The volatility forecast, denoted ˆσt+n is then deducted from the option implied volatil-
ity IVt in order to separate out the component of the implied volatility that is due
to expected future volatility versus the overhang that pushes the price (and hence
the implied volatility) around. Figure 3.1 plot the diﬀerence between implied and
realized volatility for each currency over the sample.
Given this measure of hedging demand in the option market, the next step
is to add it to the UIP regression in order to see if it is successful in bringing the
parameters closer to the UIP null. That is, we run the following regression:
st+1 − st = α + β(ft − st) + γ(IVt − σˆt+n) + et (3.9)
The results are given in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 below. For the precrisis sample starting
in 1999, the beta coeﬃcients tend to become very slightly less negative in the case of
Japan, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand. The ﬁt improves, with the exception
of Japan, suggesting that our proxy has some explanatory power in forecasting future
spot movements. However, the coeﬃcient on this variable is only signiﬁcant for the
9We tried using an expanding window approach as well wherein the full sample of data up to















































































































































































Norwegian krone. Including the Fall of 2008 in the sample leads to another slight
decrease in the beta coeﬃcient for Japan, Switzerland and the U.K. In the case of
New Zealand, including the proxy is actually successful in driving beta to nearly one,
as hypothesized by UIP, and the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence between implied and
realized volatility is statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 3.12 presents the results of the same regression over the longer sample
period. The beta coeﬃcient on the British pound is now essentially one, although it
was already slightly above one in the original UIP regression due to the ERM crisis.
The beta coeﬃcient becomes more negative for the other two currencies with the
inclusion of our proxy. The ﬁt tends to improve for both the pound and the franc.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the idea of hedging imbalances in the foreign exchange
market as being one possible cause of deviations from Uncovered interest parity. Pro-
ceeding with the hypothesis that speculators may hedge their exposure in the currency
options market, we look to this market for an indication of hedging imbalances. In
order to do this, we use measures of implied and forecast volatility to construct a mea-
sure of hedging imbalances and subsequent currency overhang in the foreign exchange
market. Adding this measure to the UIP regression results in a small rehabilitation
of UIP for some currencies, although the puzzle certainly remains. Further work will
proceed along two paths. The ﬁrst is to extend the methodology in this paper by
adding options and forward rates of diﬀerent maturities. The options in the OTC
market span maturities from one day to ten years, and it may be useful to extend
the analysis past the usual one month horizon. In particular, given that volatility
forecasting tends to be more successful at shorter horizons, it would be interesting to
conduct the equivalent analysis using options of one week maturities. A downside to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































α β γ R2 − adj.
Japan -0.0066* -1.73310 0.04670 0.00
(0.0032) (1.1205) (0.1219)
U.K. -0.00060 0.99870 0.4361* 0.04
(0.0022) (0.7922) (0.1864)
Switzerland -0.0084* -2.443* 0.6677* 0.08
(0.0027) (1.1131) (0.2044)
Table 3.12: Regressions of the log one month change in the spot exchange rate on
the log forward premium and the diﬀerence between implied and forecast volatility
over the same period, over a longer sample (May 1991 - October 2008): st+1 − st =
α+β(ft−st)+γ(IVt− σˆt)+et. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level. White standard
errors in parentheses.
the most deep. As well, it would be desirable to look at out of the money options as
well in order to see how these aﬀect the UIP regression. Risk reversals in particular
are often cited as an indicator of market participation and sentiment with regard to
the carry trade. The second extension is to account for government intervention in
the foreign exchange market. Government interference will distort the prices that we
are using to measure overhang. If, for example, the government absorbs the overhang
itself, that will take the pressure oﬀ the forward rate (possibly reducing the diﬀer-
ence between the forward and expected spot rate), and also take the pressure oﬀ the
option price (possibly reducing the diﬀerence between implied and true volatility).
One approach to handling this problem is to think of government intervention as dis-
placing the distortion, converting the distortion that we are trying to measure into a
diﬀerent distortion, namely crash risk. Using the price of out of the money options
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Extracting Risk-Neutral Moments
In order to derive the expressions for the risk-neutral variance, skewness and
kurtosis given in the text, deﬁne the volatility, cubic and quartic contracts as having








where Rt,τ (St+τ ) = ln (St+τ/St) denotes the exchange rate return. Denoting the
price of each contract that pays the corresponding non-central moment by V (t, τ) =
Eq[e−rτR2t,τ ], W (t, τ) = E
q[e−rτR3t,τ ] and X(t, τ) = E
q[e−rτR4t,τ ], these prices can be
found by ﬁnding the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the payoﬀ H(S) in each case and
then plugging into equation (1.8) setting S¯ = St. This yields the following expressions
for the price of the Variance, Cubic and Quartic Contracts:










P (t, τ ;K)dK (A.1)
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P (t, τ ;K)dK (A.3)
Given these expressions it is possible to ﬁnd the central moments, i.e., the
τ -period risk-neutral variance, skewness and kurtosis. The risk-neutral variance is
deﬁned by
V ar(t, τ) = Eq
{
[Rt,τ − Eq(Rt,τ )]2
}
= Eq(R2t,τ )− [Eq(Rt,τ )]2
= erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2 (A.4)
where µ denotes the mean currency return whose expression is derived below. Simi-
larly the τ period risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis are given by
Skew(t, τ) ≡ E
q {[R(t, τ)− Eq(R(t, τ))]3}
{Eq[R(t, τ)− Eq(R(t, τ))]2} 32
=
erτW (t, τ)− 3µ(t, τ)erτV (t, τ) + 2µ(t, τ)3
[erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2]3/2 (A.5)
Kurt(t, τ) ≡ E
q
t {(R(t, τ)− Eqt [R(t, τ)])4}
{Eq(R(t, τ)− Eq[R(t, τ)])2}2
=
erτX(t, τ)− 4µ(t, τ)erτW (t, τ) + 6erτµ(t, τ)2V (t, τ)− 3µ(t, τ)4
[erτV (t, τ)− µ(t, τ)2]2 (A.6)




St by the martingale property (where recall that S = S(t + τ), the time τ price of
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= Eqt {exp(ln(St+τ/St))} = Eqt {exp[R(t, τ)]} since S(t) is known at time
t . By the deﬁnition of the exponential function, exp[R] = 1 + R + R2/2 + R3/3 +
R4/24 + o(R4)2. Therefore



















= erτ − 1− e
rτ
2
V (t, τ)− e
rτ
6




which yields the required expression for µ(t, τ) to derive the risk-neutral variance,
skewness and kurtosis above.
1The martingale property implies that E[p(t+ T )|Φ(t)] = p(t)


























Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Delivery Conventions: Date Matching Proce-
dures in the Spot and Forward Exchange Rate
Markets
The basis of the UIP speculation strategy above consists of buying the higher
interest rate currency in the forward market against the lower interest rate one. As
an example, assume that the high interest rate currency is the New Zealand Dollar
(NZD) and the low interest rate one is the Japanese Yen (JPY). This means that on
the forward value date I am obliged to deliver Japanese Yen in order to receive the
New Zealand dollars, that is, I must have these Yen on hand. The general argument
goes that I can simultaneously buy JPY against NZD in the spot market (St+1 in the
Fama regression (3.6) above) in order to have the Yen for delivery and then realize a
proﬁt (or loss) of Ft−St+1. In order to do this, the Yen purchased in the spot market
must be delivered on the same day as the forward contract comes due, meaning that
their value dates (delivery dates) must be the same. For this reason, the correct
way to run the Fama regression is to make sure that the forward rate Ft and the
spot rate St+1 in the regression above have the same value date. Most papers ignore
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this, likely because it generally doesn't make much of a diﬀerence to whether UIP
holds. Practically speaking however, matching up value dates correctly is a serious
issue in currency markets with a signiﬁcant part of the swap market (the most traded
foreign exchange contract) made up for allowing traders to make sure value dates
match. Luca (2007) is an example of a practitioner text that goes into the details
of this point. Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) and Breuer and Wohar (1996) explain the
importance of delivery matching conventions for UIP regressions.
B.1.1 Spot Rate Delivery Conventions
The delivery date (known as the value date) of a spot foreign exchange trans-
action is two business days after the date on which the spot rate is quoted. For
example, a spot contract purchased on Friday July 22 carries a value date of Tuesday
July 26. The exceptions are the Canadian dollar and Mexican Peso, for which the
delivery date is one business day.
B.1.2 Forward Delivery Conventions
The forward value date is determined by ﬁrst ﬁnding the spot value date on
the day of which the forward contract is quoted and then taking that calendar date
into the next month. For example, a forward contract purchased on Wed July 29
has a spot value date of Friday July 31 and hence the forward value date is August
31. If August 31 is not a working day, the settlement date would move ahead to the
next working day of the month, unless the next business day means jumping to the
following month (as it would in this case)  then the forward value date is moved to the
preceding business day rather than the next business day. This is called the `month-
end' rule. One exception to this method, known as the 'end-end rule' is as follows: if
the spot value date of a forward contract is the last working day of the month, then
the delivery date of the forward contract is the last working day of the next month.
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For example, a forward contract purchased on Wed July 27 would carry a spot value
date of Friday July 29, the last working day of July. In this case the forward value
date is the last working day of August (August 31 say in this hypothetical case), not
August 29. Bekaert and Hodrick (2008, chapter 3 appendix), has a good summary of
these rules.
